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Neither the majority nor the dissenting opinions mentioned the
quality of the controversial waiver. The Supreme Court's require-
ment that waiver be an intentional relinquishment of a known right9
was not discussed. Upon inquiry, it might be found that the Lovisis
did not know of any right to sexual privacy. On the contrary, it might
be found that the couple was completely unaware of their susceptibil-
ity to intrusion as a direct result of their invitation to Dunn. The
Supreme Court has also declared a presumption against waiver of
rights and against acquiescence as waiver.2 Because the existence of
waiver is to be determined from the circumstances of each case, 93 the
Fourth Circuit erred in failing to discern the quality of the waiver of
rights in the criminal action below. In Lovisi, the Fourth Circuit has
impliedly held the state's right to proscribe certain intimate behavior
more important than a couple's right to sexual privacy. Although this
may conflict with Supreme Court precedent,94 the Court denied
certiorari, 5 which creates an uncertainty regarding the constitution-




A. Voluntariness of Guilty Pleas.
Guilty pleas account for the majority of convictions, and thus are
considered very important in the disposition of criminal defendants.'
" Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938). The Johnson standard is most
commonly applied to criminal proceedings, but the Supreme Court has invoked it
repeatedly in civil cases. See, e.g., Standard Indus. v. Tigrett, Inc., 397 U.S. 586 (1969);
Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130 (1967); Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75
(1966).
1 Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 465 (1938). See note 91 supra.
93 Id.
" See note 82 and accompanying text supra.
' 45 U.S.L.W. 3395 (U.S. Nov. 30, 1976) (No. 76-184).
Davis, The Guilty Plea Process: Exploring the Issues of Voluntariness and
Accuracy, 6 VAL. U. L. REV. 111, 111 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Davis]. As many as
85 to 90 percent of criminal prosecutions are terminated as the result of guilty pleas
and in some jurisdictions the figure runs as high as 95 percent. Id. In 1972, approxi-
mately 65 percent of the criminal defendants who were charged with crimes, pleaded
guilty to those crimes. U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE
STATsTics-1974 378 (1974).
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The values of expediency and economy, coupled with the correctional
goal of meting out appropriate punishment, have led to recognition
of the validity of the system of guilty pleas.2 When a defendant pleads
guilty he relinquishes certain constitutional rights.3 This in turn
places upon trial courts the responsibility of determining whether a
guilty plea has been entered into voluntarily, with an intelligent
awareness of the consequences of that plea.4 Recently, the Fourth
Circuit decided a number of cases in which defendents made post-
conviction attacks upon the voluntariness of their guilty pleas. Al-
though the Fourth Circuit has attempted to utilize precedent to es-
tablish a consistent rule concerning attacks upon guilty pleas, there
remains some question regarding how a trial judge can effectively
determine voluntariness at the time the plea is entered.'
2 Davis, supra note 1, at 118. See Alschuler, The Prosecutor's Role in Plea
Bargaining, 36 U. CHi. L. Rav. 50, 52-3 (1968). Disposition of criminal charges through
guilty pleas expedites criminal cases, avoids the coercive effect of prolonged pre-trial
confinement, protects the public from individuals prone to criminal conduct on
pretrial release, and enhances rehabilitative opportunities for those imprisoned by
decreasing the time between charge and conviction. Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S.
257, 261 (1971).
Among the constitutional rights relinquished are: the fifth amendment privilege
against self-incrimination, the sixth amendment right to trial by jury, and the sixth
amendment right to confront one's accusers. Davis, supra note 1, at 112. See Malloy
v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964) (privilege against self-incrimination); Duncan v. Louis-
iana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968) (right to trial by jury); Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1965)
(right to confront his accusers).
Three Supreme Court cases, commonly referred to as the Brady Trilogy, upheld
the constitutionality of guilty pleas and legitimized the "voluntariness" and
"intelligent awareness" criteria. Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742 (1970); McMann
v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759 (1970); Parker v. North Carolina, 397 U.S. 790 (1970). In
Brady, the Supreme Court determined that "[w]aivers of constitutional rights not
only must be voluntary but must be knowing, intelligent acts done with sufficient
awareness of the relevant circumstances and likely consequences." 397 U.S. at 748.
Nevertheless, the Brady court cautioned that the requirement of a knowing, intelligent
plea does not allow the defendant later to attack his plea because he did not assess all
of the consequences of that plea. 397 U.S. at 757. McMann followed Brady in its
findings concerning the validity of guilty pleas that have been intelligently made. In
addition, the McMann court stated that a guilty plea based upon "reasonably compe-
tent advice is an intelligent plea not open to attack on the ground that counsel may
have misjudged the admissibility of the defendant's confession." 397 U.S. at 770. The
Brady Trilogy was followed in Tollett v. Henderson, 411 U.S. 258 (1973). Tollett reaf-
firmed the constitutional standards for guilty pleas by holding that:
[a] guilty plea represents a break in the chain of events which has
preceded it in the criminal process. When a criminal defendant has
solemnly admitted in open court that he is in fact guilty of the offense
with which he is charged, he may not thereafter raise independent
claims relating to the deprivation of constitutional rights that oc-
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In Allison v. Blackledge,6 the Fourth Circuit determined that a
defendant may collaterally attack7 his guilty plea through allegations
of unfulfilled promises by defense counsel. The appeal of the district
court's summary denial of a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in
Allison was based upon the contention that the defendant's plea of
guilty to attempted safe robbery was involuntary due to previous
promises made by his attorney concerning the length of the sentence.'
During the trial judge's inquiry as to the voluntariness of the plea,
the defendant denied that any promises had been made to induce
him to plead guilty.9 On appeal, the defendant asserted he had made
the denial because he was told by his counsel that was the only way
for the trial court to accept the guilty plea. The Allison court deter-
mined that if in fact promises had been made by the defendant's
attorney, and if they had not been kept, the plea of guilty was not
voluntary. 0 Thus, the Fourth Circuit concluded that the district
curred prior to the entry of the guilty plea.
Id. at 267.
Tollett found support in a previous Fourth Circuit case that applied the Brady Trilogy,
Parker v. Ross, 470 F.2d 1092 (4th Cir. 1972).
See text accompanying note 26 infra.
6 533 F.2d 894 (4th Cir. 1976), cert. granted, 45 U.S.L.W. 3220 (U.S. October 5,
1976) (No.75-1693).
See note 21 infra.
In his petition for a writ of habeas corpus, Allison stated that he had been led
to believe by his lawyer that the case had been discussed with the solicitor and the
judge, and that if Allison pleaded guilty he would receive a ten-year maximum sent-
ence. Allison further stated that he pleaded guilty because he believed he would receive
only a ten-year sentence, but that after his plea was accepted he received a sentence
of seventeen to twenty-one years. 533 F.2d at 896.
' The Allison situation differs from a previous Fourth Circuit decision in United
States v. Hammerman, 528 F.2d 326 (4th Cir. 1975). In that case, the appellant, a
bagman for Spiro T. Agnew, pleaded guilty to obstructing enforcement of United
States tax laws. The appellant admitted when he entered his plea that there had been
a previous agreement not to have his sentence include incarceration. After receiving a
sentence of 18 months, the defendant appealed on the grounds that his plea was
involuntary. The Fourth Circuit held that the statements of the assistant prosecutor
confirming acceptance of the plea bargain formed a significant part of the inducement
for the guilty plea. When an unkept bargain has induced a guilty plea, the defendant
will be allowed to withdraw his plea. Id. at 332. The Fourth Circuit found that allowing
for the withdrawal of the plea was in accord with FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(e)(4) (as
amended, December 1, 1975).
"* 533 F.2d at 897. The court's major authority for this conclusion was the Su-
preme Court case of Machibroda v. United States, 368 U.S. 487 (1962), in which a
promise made by a prosecutor had been broken. The Court held that if a guilty plea
has been induced by threats or promises it has been deprived of its voluntariness and
is therefore void. Id. at 493. Machibroda has been extended to include cases like Allison
in which a defendant has been allowed to attack the voluntariness of his guilty plea
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court erroneously denied the defendant's petition for a writ of habeas
corpus because an evidentiary hearing was not conducted to ascertain
the truth of his allegations."1 The court of appeals, however, failed to
provide any guidelines that might be applied by trial judges when
they are accepting a guilty plea.
Allison's conviction resulted from a state court proceeding in
which the trial judge specifically asked the defendant if any promise
had been made to him. Despite the defendant's denial, the Fourth
Circuit perceived a genuine issue as to the voluntariness of the plea.
As Judge Field argued in his special concurrence in Allison, no matter
how thoroughly a trial judge questions a defendant about the exist-
ence of promises, convicted prisoners "all too often" later allege that
they had been induced by defense counsel to give false answers."2
Edwards v. Garrison'3 again presented the Fourth Circuit with the
issue of when state prisoners are entitled to evidentiary hearings
when they subsequently question the voluntariness of their guilty
pleas. The appellant in Edwards was convicted of burglary and felon-
because of a broken promise by his own counsel. United States v. Hawthorne, 502 F.2d
1183 (3rd Cir. 1974); Roberts v. United States, 486 F.2d 980 (5th Cir. 1973).
533 F.2d at 897.
,2 Allison v. Blackledge, 533 F.2d 894, 899 (4th Cir. 1976). (Field, J. concurring).
Judge Field also argued in his concurrence that it is unrealistic to accord such weight
to the defendant's allegations concerning promises and inducements made by defense
counsel since "it is inconceivable that any attorney in his right mind would jeopardize
his professional reputation and his license to practice law by engaging in such con-
duct." Id.
A different issue was presented in Hammond v. United States, 528 F.2d 15 (4th
Cir. 1975). In Hammond, the defendant was mistakenly led to believe by his counsel
that he faced a total maximum sentence of 95 years if he was convicted of committing
bank robbery, while in actuality the maximum sentence he could have received was
55 years. The defendant alleged that because he was afraid of a 95 year sentence, he
accepted the terms of a plea bargain. Unlike Allison, which concerned a defendant's
misunderstanding about the possible sentence resulting from a guilty plea, Hammond
dealt with the possible sentence resulting from a plea of not guilty. In allowing the
defendant to plead anew, the Hammond court tended to overlook the procedural
requirements of Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure and instead relied
upon what it considered "patently erroneous advice" rendering a counsel's representa-
tion ineffective. 528 F.2d at 18.
U 529 F.2d 1374 (4th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 96 S.Ct. 1421 (1976) heard in con-
junction with Bass v. United States, 529 F.2d 1374 (4th Cir. 1975). The only substantial
difference between Bass and Edwards was that Bass concerned a federal prisoner
bringing a § 2255 motion and Edwards concerned a state prisoner bringing a § 2254
motion. See note 21 infra. The court determined that these differences would have no
substantive effect on the holdings, because the cases contained similar general inquir-
ies into the guilty pleas when they were made. Id. at 1376. For history of Bass on
remand and subsequent appeal see note 28 infra.
19771
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ious escape and received a sentence of thirty years to life. Despite his
affirmations when he entered his guilty plea that no promises had
been made to him, the appellant's sworn petition of habeas corpus
alleged that his plea had been induced by a promise made by defense
counsel that the sentence would not exceed twenty years. The court
of appeals determined that the claims made by the appellant estab-
lished the possible existence of a plea bargain because the trial court
never specifically asked whether a plea bargain had been made.'5
While granting an evidentiary hearing in order to inquire into the
voluntariness of the appellant's guilty plea, the Edwards court stated
that its holding was of limited precedential significance since the
state of North Carolina had recently made changes in its require-
ments for guilty plea proceedings.'" The revised North Carolina
"Transcript of Negotiated Plea" directs questions to the prosecutor,
the defendant, and his counsel pertaining to the existence of any plea
bargain.'7 Although the dictum of Edwards might indicate that the
Fourth Circuit views specific inquiry at the trial level as sufficient to
prevent subsequent questions of the voluntariness of guilty pleas,
cases involving federal prisoners have held that this is not always
true.'"
The general provisions that federal judges must follow in
ascertaining voluntariness are expressed in Rule 11 of the Federal
Rules of Criminal Procedure. Rule 11 requires the judge to question
the defendent in open court in order to determine that the plea is
voluntary and not the result of coercion or force." The rule also re-
quires the judge to inquire whether the defendant's plea arose from
a previous plea agreement with the prosecutor or defense attorney. 0
, 529 F.2d at 1375.
,Id. at 1377.
Id. at 1378.
'7 See N.C. GEN. STAT. §15A-1026 (Interim Supp. 1976).
," Bass v. United States, 529 F.2d 1374 (4th Cir. 1975); Walters v. Harris, 460 F.2d
988 (4th Cir. 1972).
" FED. R. CuM. P. 11(d) (as amended December 1, 1975). In Santobello v. New
York, 404 U.S. 257, 261 (1971), the Supreme Court stressed the importance of a judge's
inquiries as to the existence of any promise in holding that a plea of guilty must be
voluntary and knowing and if it was induced by promises, the content of such promises
must be known. Id.
20 The Official Comment to Rule 11 provides:
Designated as subdivision (d) existing provisions requiring the
court to address the defendant personally before accepting a plea of
guilty or nolo contendere to determine whether the plea is voluntary,
added provisions requiring that the court's inquiry be made in open
court, expanded the area of the court's inquiry to include whether the
FOURTH CIRCUIT REVIEW
Failure by a trial court to follow the requirements of Rule 11 consti-
tutes reversible error and will give the defendant the opportunity to
make a collateral attackl on his conviction and plead anew.?
The record in Bass v. United Statesns indicated that the trial judge
had complied with the requirements of Rule 11 by telling the defen-
dant before the guilty plea was accepted that plea bargaining was
approved by the Supreme Court24 and that there should be no hesita-
tion in telling the court of any plea agreement. The defendant's attor-
ney replied that there had been a plea bargain and the prosecutor had
promised to recommend a three-year sentence. ' The trial judge then
stated that he would not be bound by the plea agreement and he
would be free to impose whatever sentence he deemed necessary. 6
Finally, the judge determined that the plea was voluntary and it was
accepted. Despite the evidence of the judge's Rule 11 inquiries, the
defendant claimed that he had been assured by his counsel that the
plea is the result of force or threats or of promises apart from a plea
agreement, and substituted provisions directing the court to inquire
whether the defendant's willingness to plead guilty or nolo contendere
results from prior discussions between the attorney for the government
and the defendant or his attorney for provisions authorizing the court
to refuse to accept a plea of guilty and directing the court to determine
whether the plea is made with an understanding of the nature of the
charge and the consequences of the plea.
1975 Amendment Official Comment.
11 For a discussion of collateral attacks upon convictions, see Comment, Plea
Bargaining Mishaps-The Possibility of Collaterally Attacking the Resultant Plea of
Guilty, 65 J. CmM. L.C. & C. 170, 171 (1974).
2 McCarthy v. United States, 394 U.S. 459, 468 (1969). In Gwinn v. United States,
Civ. No. 75-1180 (4th Cir. March 15, 1976), the Fourth Circuit reversed and remanded
the appellant's guilty plea. There, the trial judge failed to explain to the defendant
the elements of the crime with which he was charged when the guilty plea was ac-
cepted. The Fourth Circuit held that the requirements of Rule 11 were not fulfilled
because the defendant lacked an understanding of the nature of the charge to which
he was pleading guilty. See Dorrough v. United States, 385 F.2d 887, 890 (5th Cir.
1967), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 1019 (1969); Hulsey v. United States, 369 F.2d 284, 286-
87 (5th Cir. 1966); Munich v. United States, 337 F.2d 356, 360 (9th Cir. 1964).
11 Bass v. United States, 529 F.2d 1374 (4th Cir. 1975), reported sub nom Edwards
v. Garrison, 529 F.2d 1374 (4th Cir. 1975).
24 The Supreme Court recognized plea bargaining as a necessary part of the sys-
tem of criminal justice in Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257 (1971). For an analysis
of the usefulness of plea bargaining, see Weintraub & Tough, Lesser Pleas Considered,
32 J. CRm. L.C. & C. 506 (1942); Note, Guilty Plea Bargaining: Compromises by
Prosecutors to Secure Guilty Pleas, 112 U. PENN. L. REv. 865 (1964).
' This recommended sentence was in accordance with charges against Bass for
distributing heroin in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841 (1970).
1' 529 F.2d at 1378. The judge was limited by the statutory maximum, which was
six years, under the Federal Youth Corrections Act, 18 U.S.C. § 5010 (1970).
1977]
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plea agreement would be binding on the court. The Fourth Circuit
held that although the trial court had made an extensive inquiry into
the voluntariness of the plea, the defendant might subsequently be
able to controvert his statements made during that inquiry.Y As in
Edwards, Bass was reversed and remanded for an evidentiary hearing
to determine the truthfulness of the defendant's allegations.
2
8
The Fourth Circuit's holding in Bass, however, conflicts with the
Fifth Circuit's holding in Bryan v. United States.29 In Bryan, the
defendant pleaded guilty to bank robbery and escaping from custody.
Subsequently, he brought a § 2255 motion" claiming that an unkept
plea agreement had induced him to plead guilty on the escape charge.
Faced with a factual situation very similar to that in Bass, the Bryan
court refused to allow the appellant to controvert the answers he
made to questions presented by the trial judge at the time the guilty
pleas were accepted. The records of the plea proceeding in this case,
as in Bass, revealed extensive questioning by the judge concerning
the existence of any plea agreements. 3' The Fifth Circuit held that
this questioning was adequate to preclude the defendant from subse-
quently attacking the voluntariness of his plea." The Bryan court
recognized the need for more adequate Rule 11 proceedings and it
supported proposed amendments to the Rule which were later
instituted in 1975.13 To reduce challenges to the voluntariness of
guilty pleas, amendments to Rule 11 require extensive inquiries by
27 Id. at 1380. In support of this conclusion, the Fourth Circuit cited Crawford v.
United States, 519 F.2d 347 (4th Cir. 1975), which stated that a federal prisoner would
be able to controvert prior Rule 11 statements because "he may have been advised to
give answers that the court would require in order to accept the plea, rather than those
which reflected the truth." Id. at 351.
28 On remand, the district court conducted an evidentiary hearing concerning the
voluntariness of Bass's guilty plea. Because Bass was not told by his counsel to deny
any off-the-record promise and because he was not told that the plea bargain was
binding on the judge, the guilty plea would stand. On appeal, the district court's denial
of Bass's § 2255 motion was affirmed by the Fourth Circuit. Bass v. United States,
Civ. No. 76-1231 (4th Cir. Dec. 10, 1976).
492 F.2d 775 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1079 (1974).
- 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (1970). For a discussion of § 2255, see Uelman, Post-Conviction
Relief for Federal Prisoners A Survey and a Suggestion Under 28 U.S.C. § 2255, 69 W.
VA. L. REv. 277 (1967).
11 492 F.2d at 780. The judge's questions were directed to both the defendant and
his attorney, who "testified without conflict or equivocation that no plea bargain had
been made or promises, directly or indirectly." Id.
= Id.
3 Id. at 781. See note 19 supra. See also A.B.A. PROJECT ON MINIMUM STANDARDS
FOR CmnAL JusTIcE, APPROVED DRAFr, STANDARDS RELATING TO PLEAS OF GUILTY, §§
1.5 & 3.1-3.4 (1968).
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trial judges as to the existence of a plea agreement.
Because the Fifth Circuit realistically examined the inquiry pro-
ceeding conducted by the trial judge, Bryan appears to be a better
adjudication of the voluntariness question than the Fourth Circuit's
decision in Bass. The extent of the inquiries made by the judges in
both cases accorded with the requirements of Rule 11, yet the Bass
court allowed a defendant to controvert his statements because of the
Fourth Circuit's subjective determination that the plea had not been
a product of the defendant's "informed free will."' The "informed
free will" standard in Bass necessarily creates problems for trial
judges at the time they are accepting guilty pleas and impairs the
viability of Rule 11 inquiries."
In addition to its conflict with the Fifth Circuit in the granting of
evidentiary hearings on prisoner's § 2255 motions, the Fourth Circuit
itself has not always been consistent in the interpretation of the issue
concerning voluntariness of guilty pleas. The court of appeals did
restrict the granting of an evidentiary hearing in the disposition of a
§ 2255 petition in Raines v. United States." The appellant in Raines
asserted that he was "influenced" by a probation officer to plead
guilty, and that a full evidentiary hearing concerning the voluntari-
ness of that guilty plea should have been granted." The Fourth Cir-
cuit, however, ruled that full compliance with Rule 11 at the trial,
which revealed that the guilty plea was neither induced nor coerced,
did not require a subsequent evidentiary hearing.s
Allison, Edwards, Bass and Raines reflect the confusion that ex-
ists within the Fourth Circuit concerning subsequent attacks upon
the voluntariness of guilty pleas. Viewing the cases together permits
an inference that no matter how extensively a state or federal trial
judge questions a defendant before accepting a guilty plea, the judge
1 529 F.2d at 1380.
I Judge Field's special concurrence in Allison v. Blackledge addressed itself to
problems with the Fourth Circuit's approach to the issue of post-conviction guilty plea
attack. Allison v. Blackledge, 533 F.2d 894, 899 (4th Cir. 1976) (Field, J. concurring).
His concurrence was based on his concession that "recognition of Edwards v. Garrison,
529 F.2d 1374 (4th Cir. 1975), [was] viable precedent" supporting the majority's
holding. Id. at 898.
423 F.2d 526 (4th Cir. 1970).
31 Id. at 531. The actual type of "influence" exerted by the probation officer was
not clarified by the appellant. The court found that this mere, unsupported allegation
insufficient to require a hearing. Id.
m Id. at 530. The court stated that the requirements of Rule 11 are "intended to
produce a complete record of the factors relevant to the voluntariness of the guilty plea
and, thereby, to forestall subsequent controversy as to voluntariness." Id.
1977]
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may not be assured of whether that plea is subject to future attack.2
Rule 11 exemplifies congressional recognition of this problem40 and
recent amendments to that rule have therefore placed requirements
upon the judge to insure the validity of the plea.' Nevertheless, the
Fourth Circuit holdings imply that this is not enough; apparently the
court fears that Rule 11 inquiries cannot be considered as conclusive
evidence that all plea bargains have been revealed.42 The Fifth Cir-
cuit's decision in Bryan, however, represents a logical approach to the
voluntariness problem since it recognized precautions that had been
used at the trial level. The efficacy of guilty pleas rests upon their
efficient disposition of criminal defendants;4 if the Fourth Circuit
does not permit an effective voluntariness inquiry at the trial level,
guilty pleas may lose this advantage.
DAVID H. ALDRICH
B. Search and Seizure: Warrantless Automobile Searches.
In the past decade the Supreme Court has frequently examined
warrantless automobile inventory searches,' and warrantless automo-
bile searches based upon probable cause existing on the highway, but
with the search commencing after the automobile has been driven to
the police station, garage, or impoundment lot.2 The Supreme Court's
" Allison v. Blackledge, 533 F.2d 894, 899 (4th Cir. 1976) (Field, J., specially
concurring).
40 McCarthy v. United States, 394 U.S. 459, 464-66 (1969).
' See note 19 supra.
42 Walters v. Harris, 460 F.2d 988, 993 (4th Cir. 1972). The rationale in Walters
concerning the effectiveness of Rule 11 inquiries was used by the Fourth Circuit to
support its holding in Bass.
See note 2 supra.
The fourth amendment provides in pertinent part that "[the right of the
people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable
searches and seizures, shall not be violated. . . ." U.S. CONST. amend. IV. For recent
cases involving warrantless inventory searches see South Dakota v. Opperman, 96 S.
Ct. 3092 (1976); Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433 (1973); United States v. Harris,
390 U.S. 234 (1968); Cooper v. California, 386 U.S. 58 (1967). See Note, Cady v.
Dombrowski: The Demise of Coolidge, 35 U. Prrr. L. REv. 712 (1974); Comment, The
Automobile Inventory Search and Cady v. Dombrowski, 20 ViLL. L. REv. 147 (1974).
2 Texas v. White, 423 U.S. 67 (1975); Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443
(1971); Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42 (1970). See Note, The WarrantlessAutomo-
bile Search and Chambers v. Maroney, 28 BAYLOR L. REv. 151 (1976); Note,
Warrantless Searches and Seizures of Automobiles and the Supreme Court From Car-
roll to Cardwell: Inconsistently Through the Seamless Web, 53 N.C.L. REv. 722 (1975).
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latest major decision concerning warrantless inventory searches is
South Dakota v. Opperman.3 In Opperman the Court held that a
warrantless inventory search revealing drugs in the glove compart-
ment was reasonable, as the expectation of privacy in one's automo-
bile is significantly less than in one's home,4 and police inventories
are conducted in the interest of protecting the owner's property, and
the custodian's and public's safety.5 Correspondingly, the Supreme
Court's most recent decision on whether probable cause for a war-
rantless search still existed at the police station after the stopping of
a motorist on the highway was Texas v. White.' In a per curiam
opinion, the Court held that probable cause still obtained at the
police station, and upheld the warrantless search.7 These issues were
recently reviewed by the Fourth Circuit in Cabbler v.
3 96 S. Ct. 3092 (1976).
' The expectation of privacy principle was developed by the Supreme Court in
Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967). There the Court held that once one has
entered a telephone booth, closed the door,and is justifiably relying on the privacy of
the booth, monoriting the conversation by electronic listening devices is a violation of
the fourth amendment's right to privacy. Id. at 352. Subsequently, Cardwell v. Lewis,
417 U.S. 583, 590 (1974), held that one's expectation of privacy in an automobile is
less than that found in one's home or office.
5 In Opperman, the defendant's car was ticketed twice for parking violations over
a period of eight hours. The car was finally impounded and towed to the city impound
lot. At the lot, police noticed valuables in plain view inside the car, and subsequently
unlocked it to conduct a standard inventory. Marijuana was found in the unlocked
glove compartment. Later that day the defendant went to the police station to claim
his property, and was subsequently arrested and convicted on a charge of possession
of marijuana. The Supreme Court upheld the warrantless search as reasonable under
the fourth amendment's search and seizure clause. 96 S. Ct. at 3100.
4 423 U.S. 67 (1975). In White, police stopped White near a drive-in bank as they
had reason to believe he was passing fraudulent checks. After White attempted to stuff
something between the car seats he was arrested, and a police officer drove his car back
to the station house. At the station White refused to consent to an automobile search,
but the police conducted a warrantless automobile search about 45 minutes after
arrival. Checks were found and White was subsequently convicted of knowingly at-
tempting to pass a forged instrument. Id. at 305. See Note, The Warrantless Automo-
bile Search and Chambers v. Maroney, 28 BAYLOR L. REV. 151 (1976).
White was an affirmance of the Supreme Court's prior decision in Chambers v.
Maroney, 399 U.S. 42 (1970).
A 528 F.2d 1142 (4th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 97 S. Ct. 60 (1976). In Cabbler, the
Fourth Circuit also examined the scope of review necessary in an appeal for habeas
corpus relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (1970) (application for a writ of habeas corpus in
behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a state court). The Common-
wealth argued that the concurring opinion of Justice Powell in Schneckloth v. Busta-
monte, 412 U.S. 218, 250 (1973) should be applied. Under Justice Powell's approach,
the only question on federal habeas corpus review would be whether the petitioner had
19771
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Superintendent,8 and United States v. Chulengarian1
In Cabbler, the defendant was convicted of grand larceny" and
petit larceny." The police were seeking Cabbler in connection with a
felony charge of shooting into an occupied dwelling.' 2 They observed
Cabbler enter a hospital for treatment of a gunshot wound, followed
him, and once in the hospital arrested him on the shooting charge.'"
Cabbler was then placed in a patrol car to be taken to the police
station. At that time, Cabbler requested the police officers to roll up
his car windows, as it had begun to rain. While rolling up the win-
dows, the police noticed and seized a pistol in the back seat. After
taking Cabbler to the station, the police returned to the hospital to
drive Cabbler's car to the city garage where a warrantless inventory
search took place," which yielded stolen goods in the trunk of the
automobile. The seizure of the pistol was not an issue in the case,'6
and the Fourth Circuit upheld the warrantless inventory search.
In Cabbler, the Fourth Circuit relied heavily on the protective
purposes of the inventory search to uphold the intrusion. This protec-
tion rationale has been fully developed by four Supreme Court deci-
sions. In United States u. Harris,'7 the Court upheld a warrantless
inventory search because it served to protect the car and the owner's
property while in police custody. 8 While this decision would cover the
a fair opportunity to litigate fourth amendment claims in the state courts. Id. at 250.
The Fourth Circuit disagreed, and held that it may properly review the merits of
Cabbler's search and seizure claim. Cabbler v. Superintendent, 528 F.2d at 1145. That
decision would probably not stand after Stone v. Powell, 96 S. Ct. 3037, 3052 (1976).
For a discussion of Stone, see Habeas Corpus And Prisoner's Rights, Section A, notes
68-76, infra.
' 538 F.2d 553 (4th Cir. 1976).
,0 VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-95 (Repl. Vol. 1975).
" VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-96 (Repl. Vol. 1975).
12 VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-279 (Repl. Vol. 1975).
11 Cabbler v. Superintendent, 374 F. Supp. 690 (E.D. Va. 1974). The transcript
revealed that Cabbler erroneously thought he would stay in the hospital all night
because of the wound. Id. at 691-92.
" Because of complaints made and claims filed by Roanoke, Virginia, citizens in
1964-65, police inventory of impounded automobiles was required by the Roanoke
Police Department in an effort to prevent loss or theft.
Is According to the trial court transcript, Cabbler did not give the police permis-
sion to remove the car, or look in the trunk of the car. Also, the police did not suspect
stolen goods were in the trunk, but rather retrieved Cabbler's automobile to keep it
safe until Cabbler was released from jail. Cabbler v. Superintendent, 374 F. Supp. 690,
692 (E.D. Va. 1974).
1 528 F.2d at 1144 n.2.
17 390 U.S. 234 (1968).
'1 Id. A warrantless inventory search was upheld in Harris when evidence was
inadvertently discovered in plain view by police while rolling up the car windows and
locking the doors. The Court found this to be a measure taken by the police to protect
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uncontested seizure of the gun in Cabbler,'9 the second seizure of
Cabbler's property is arguably not covered by the Harris decision."
Another dimension of the Court's reliance on the protective pur-
poses associated with a warrantless inventory search is found in
Cooper v. California.2' In Cooper, the Court indicated that protec-
tion of the police from potential false claims by the property owner
is a valid reason for conducting a warrantless inventory search.3
Finally, the protection principle was extended to the police in Cady
v. Dombrowski." The Court in Cady held that when the police have
the car while it was in police custody, and held that under such circumstances the
fourth amendment does not require police to obtain a warrant. Id. at 236. See note 1
supra.
, See text accompanying note 16 supra.
The goods found in Cabbler's trunk were not in plain view, nor were they
inadvertently discovered while the officer was rolling up the windows of Cabbler's car.
The only possible application of Harris to Cabbler is a broad reading of Harris concern-
ing the police duty to protect the owner's goods. Harris v. United States, 390 U.S. at
236. However, the Harris Court also specifically stated that it did not consider the
Harris facts to constitute a search, and therefore was not deciding the admissibility of
evidence found in an inventory search pursuant to police regulations. Id. Apparently,
the broad reading of Harris is not the correct.interpretation. See Comment, The Auto-
mobile Inventory Search and Cady v. Dombrowski, 20 ViLL. L. Rzv. 147, 171 (1974).
21 386 U.S. 58 (1967).
2 Id. In Cooper, the defendant was arrested on a narcotics charge as he was about
to enter his automobile. Defendant was driven to the police station, and his car was
seized as evidence under a California forfeiture statute. Law of June 23, 1955, ch. 1209,
§ 2, [1955] Cal. Stats. 2224 (repealed 1967) (formerly CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §
11611 (West)). One week after impoundment, the automobile was searched without a
warrant and evidence found in the search was admitted at trial. The Court emphasized
the fact that since the automobile would be in police custody for at least four months,
the police had a right to search in order to protect themselves. 386 U.S. at 61-62. For
a discussion of how courts have interpreted Cooper, see Note, The Inventory Search
of an Impounded Vehicle, 48 Cm.-KErT L. Rev. 48, 52-53 (1971). See also Comment,
Police Inventories of the Contents of Vehicles and the Exclusionary Rule, 29 WASH. &
LEE L. REv. 197, 204 (1972). Subsequent cases in state and federal courts have generally
upheld warrantless police inventory searches under the protection rationales expressed
in Harris and Cooper. See, e.g., United States v. Mitchell, 458 F.2d 960 (9th Cir. 1972)
(evidence admissible as police were protecting owner's property in a lawfully im-
pounded car); United States v. Pennington, 441 F.2d 249 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 404
U.S. 854 (1971) (inventory search only to protect goods of owners and to keep arrestee's
property in order); Capps v. State, 505 S.W.2d 727 (Tenn. 1954). But see Mozzetti v.
Superior Court, 4 Cal. 3d 699, 484 P.2d 84, 94 Cal. Rptr. 412 (1971). While most
appellate courts have been sympathetic to police inventory searches, the Eighth Cir-
cuit, unlike the Fourth Circuit in Cabbler, did not view police protective measures as
extending to the opening of a locked trunk, and preferred a method of letting the owner
make his own arrangements for removal and storage of his vehicle. United States v.
Lawson, 487 F.2d 468 (8th Cir. 1973).
413 U.S. 433 (1973).
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a reasonable belief that a gun is in the trunk of an automobile in
police custody, the police may search the trunk without, a warrant to
protect the public from a dangerous weapon.
2 4
A summary of these holdings provided the grounds for the recent
Supreme Court decision in Opperman.- There, the warrantless in-
ventory search was condoned on the ground that there is a diminished
expectation of privacy in one's automobile,'2- and under the particular
circumstances, the search was reasonable.? The Opperman Court
specifically upheld warrantless police inventory searches as reasona-
ble if done to accomplish any of three distinct purposes: protection
of the owner's property, protection of police against claims, and pro-
tection of public safety.n
Although the Fourth Circuit decided Cabbler before Opperman,
the reasoning was essentially identical. Against the background of
Harris, Cooper, and Cady, the Fourth Circuit in Cabbler relied heav-
ily on the protection assured by an inventory search. As the Supreme
Court has done in Opperman, the Cabbler court read those cases as
holding that inventory searches are valid if used to protect the
owner's property, the safety of the custodian, or the safety of the
public. 9 The court upheld the search in Cabbler, finding the search
reasonable in its purpose to protect the automobile owner's property,
214 In Cady, defendant was involved in an accident, and his car was towed to a
privately-owned garage and left unguarded. Subsequently, police arrested defendant,
who apparently had stated that he was a Chicago police officer, for drunk driving.
Later, the car was searched at the garage without a warrant. The purpose of that search
was to locate a revolver, which the arresting police thought Chicago police officers were
required to carry at all times. The search revealed blood-soaked clothing and other
items in the trunk, which led to defendant's subsequent conviction for murder. Id. at
433-39. The Supreme Court upheld the warrantless search on the grounds of public
protection, as the general public "might be endangered if an intruder removed a
revolver from the trunk of the vehicle." Id. at 447. See Comment, The Automobile
Inventory Search and Cady v. Dombrowski, 20 VILL. L. REv. 147, 172-79 (1974).
25 South Dakota v. Opperman, 96 S. Ct. 3092 (1976).
" Id. at 3096, The dissent in Opperman argued that prior cases had held that one
suffers a diminished expectation of privacy in one's automobile only if exigent circum-
stances exist, Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42 (1970), see note 40 infra, or because
the automobile lends itself to plain view. Cardwell v. Lewis, 417 U.S. 583, 590 (1974)
(plurality opinion). The dissent saw neither exception as apposite to Opperman. South
Dakota v. Opperman, 96 S. Ct. at 3105-06 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
21 See note 5 supra.
28 See South Dakota v. Opperman, 96 S. Ct. at 3096-99.
528 F.2d at 1146. For a proposal regarding further limitations on searches based
on protective purposes, see Note, Warrantless Searches and Seizures of Automobiles
and the Supreme Court From Carroll to Cardwell: Inconsistently Through the Seam-
less Web, 53 N.C.L. REv. 722, 762-63 (1975).
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and to protect the city from false claims. 0 While Cab bler's reasoning,
particularly in light of Opperman, complies with the Supreme
Court's holdings, it is nevertheless questionable as it would effec-
tively uphold all warrantless inventory searches.3 ' Furthermore, the
specific facts of Cabbler do not fit neatly into the circumstances the
Supreme Court found controlling in Harris, Cooper, and Cady. The
goods found in Cabbler were not discovered in plain view,32 but in a
locked trunk.3 In addition, the search apparently was not closely
related to the reason for the arrest, the impoundment, or the reten-
tion of the automobile .3 Likewise, there was no indication that Cab-
" 528 F.2d at 1146. The court's concern regarding false claims centers on the
possibility that police may be held liable for specious claims of goods lost while in
police custody, or not returned after custody is terminated. The inventory search
counteracts that possibility. The Fifth Circuit has expressed the same concern and
upheld the same solution. United States v. Gravitt, 484 F.2d 375, 378 (5th Cir. 1973),
cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1135 (1974); United States v. Lipscomb, 435 F.2d 795, 800 (5th
Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 980 (1971). For a discussion on the viability of police
liability in these custodial situations, see Comment, Police Inventories of the Contents
of Vehicles and the Exclusionary Rule, 29 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 197, 204-07 (1972). A
justification for the search may also have been based on protection of the public, as a
gun had previously been found in the car in-plain view. See text accompanying notes
13-14 supra. Arguably, however, protection of public safety should not be a justifica-
tion for the search in Cabbler. See text accompanying note 36 infra.
31 South Dakota v. Opperman, 96 S. Ct. 3092, 3107-08 (1976) (Marshall, J., dis-
senting). The Opperman decision has not clarified all inventory search problems. See
United States v. Morrow, 541 F.2d 1229, 1232 (7th Cir. 1976) (warrantless inventory
search conducted one day after impoundment upheld); Altman v. State, 335 So. 2d
626 (1976) (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1976) (arrestee requested to make own arrangements
for removal of car, and friend was available for such purpose; held that since police
did not have probable cause to believe contraband was in vehicle, and arrestee could
take care of car, warrantless inventory search unnecessary and unreasonable under the
fourth amendment); Robertson v. State, 541 S.W.2d 608 (Tex Crim. App. 1976) (cus-
tody and control by police synonomous, as inventory search completed before car was
towed to private lot upheld).
2 United States v. Harris, 390 U.S. 234 (1968).
" For a collection of cases concerning the lawfulness of searching locked trunks,
see Annot., 48 A.L.R.3d 537, 577-79 (1973). Furthermore, Opperman does not fully
encompass the Cabbler facts, as in Opperman the goods were found in an unlocked
glove compartment. The Court stated that unless an inventory search was conducted,
vandals, once inside the car, would have ready and unobstructed access to the goods.
96 S. Ct. at 3100 n.10. A locked trunk, as found in Cabbler, would presumably negate
such access.
1 Cooper v. California, 386 U.S. 58 (1967). The Cabbler trial transcript showed
that the police did not suspect that stolen goods were in fhe trunk. 374 F. Supp. at
692. Also, Cabbler was arrested for shooting into an occupied dwelling. Thus, there
does not seem to be the close relation between the search and arrest that was found in
Cooper. In Cooper, the arrest was for selling heroin, and the seizure was pursuant to a
statute requiring forfeiture of any vehicle used to sell or transport narcotics in order
to hold the vehicle as evidence. Impoundment then became necessary because of the
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bler's automobile was destined to remain in police custody for a suffi-
cient length of time to justify the reasonableness of a search to protect
the custodian. 5 Finally, unlike the situation in Cady, the police in
Cabbler arguably had little reason to believe that anything injurious
to themselves or the public was contained in the trunk, as they had
already found a pistol in the car that was likely the weapon used in
the shooting incident.
3 6
The court's analysis and holding in Cabbler would seem to vali-
date any warrantless inventory search if the police contend that the
purpose of the search was for protection or safekeeping. However,
since Opperman employed the same analysis as that used by the
Fourth Circuit in Cabbler,7 Cabbler is probably an accurate reflec-
tion of the law on warrantless searches. The Supreme Court's deci-
sions may have permitted lower courts to uphold warrantless police
inventory searches in practically any situation."
A warrantless search conducted at a time and place distant from
that of arrest was the concern of the Fourth Circuit in United States
v. Chulengarian.39 The defendant was a passenger in the car of Evans,
who was arrested for driving under the influence of alcohol. After
Evans failed to produce any evidence of ownership, the automobile
was impounded. As the arresting officer entered Evan's car to drive
it to the police impoundment lot, he observed marijuana on the floor,
and then found more drugs on the back seat. In addition, a revolver
was discovered in the glove compartment during this initial search.
The car was driven to the lot and searched again without a warrant,
three to four hours after the initial search. A third warrantless search
was conducted the night after the impoundment, and more drugs
were found in the headliner of the automobile. The district court
suppressed the evidence on the ground of lack of exigent circumstan-
ces,4" but the Fourth Circuit vacated that suppression and re-
forfeiture provision of the statute. The Court stated that the inventory search was thus
closely related to the reason for arrest, seizure, and impoundment. 386 U.S. at 60-61.
Cooper v. California, 386 U.S. 58 (1967). See note 22 supra.
' For an analysis similar to that used in the text, see United States v. Lawson,
487 F.2d 468 (8th Cir. 1973). Lawson's factual setting resembled the setting in Cabbler.
3 See text accompanying notes 29-31 supra.
See Comment, The Automobile Inventory Search and Cady v. Dombrowski, 20
ViLL. L. REv. 147, 164-65, 172 (1974).
31 538 F.2d 553 (4th Cir. 1976).
" Id. at 554. The concept of "exigent circumstances" in regard to automobile
searches was developed in Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925). In Carroll,
two federal agents stopped an automobile as they reasonably suspected it to contain
contraband. The agents had no probable cause to arrest the automobile's occupants,
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manded." The court of appeals based its decision on the Supreme
Court's recent holding in Texas v. White,42 which had relied on the
Court's previous decision in Chambers v. Maroney.3
In Chambers, the exigent circumstances of mobility and danger
justified the warrantless search back at the police station.44 Addition-
ally, the Chambers Court spoke of an immediate search at the police
station." The Chambers rule generally has been interpreted as requir-
ing two conditions: probable cause and mobility of the automobile."
Arguably, the officer in Chulengarian had probable cause to believe
narcotics might be in the automobile. However, once the automobile
was impounded it would cease to be mobile. 7 In that situation, the
exigent circumstance requirement of Chambers would not be ful-
filled."
but did have probable cause to believe the automobile contained contraband. A search
on the highway uncovered the contraband, and the Court upheld the warrantless
search due to exigent circumstances that existed because the police had probable cause
to search and the car was mobile. If both conditions were met the search could be
upheld, as the vehicle could be "quickly moved out of the locality or jurisdiction." Id.
at 153. Exigent circumstances involves a balancing of interests, and implies a police
need sufficient to override the interests of the private citizen. See Comment,
Warrantless Searches and Seizures of Automobiles, 87 HARv. L. REv. 835, 836 (1974).
41 538 F.2d 533 (4th Cir. 1976).
42 See text accompanying note 6 supra.
See note 7 supra.
" Due to the mobility of an automobile, evidence might have been lost if the car
had not been searched. Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42, 51 (1970). Furthermore,
an immediate search was not practicable in Chambers because of darkness and danger.
Id. at 52 n.10.
" The Chambers Court began its analysis by weighing the amount of intrusion
involved in conducting a warrantless search against immobilizing the car until a war-
rant was obtained. 399 U.S. at 51-52. The Court went on to state:
For constitutional purposes, we see no difference between on the one
hand seizing and holding a car before presenting the probable cause
issue to a magistrate and on the other hand carrying out an immediate
search without a warrant. Given probable cause to search, either
course is reasonable under the Fourth Amendment.
Id. at 52.
,1 See Comment, The Warrantless Automobile Search and Chambers v. Maroney,
28 BAYLOR L. REV. 151, 160 (1976). See also note 40 supra.
4 See note 48 infra.
' A distinction has been offered between the mobility of impounded cars, and the
mobility of cars not impounded, but still driven to the station house. See Comment,
The Warrantless Automobile Search and Chambers v. Maroney, 28 BAYLOR L. REV.
151, 160-61 (1976). The Chambers Court held that the mobility of the car still obtained
at the station house. 399 U.S. at 52. The article concludes that since the arrested driver
and occupants of the car obviously could not move the car, the Court must have been
concerned with a relative or friend moving the car. As the car was not impounded in
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Even if exigent circumstances were present in Chulengarian, there
remains an additional problem concerning the time sequence in-
volved. The first search at the impoundment lot occurred three to
four hours after the initial search. The second warrantless search at
the lot occurred the next night. Although the Chambers Court as-
serted that given probable cause at the scene of the stopping, proba-
ble cause still maintained at the station house,49 the Court also re-
ferred to an immediate warrantless search conducted at the im-
poundment lot or police station." In situations like Chambers, courts
generally have upheld searches that were conducted immediately or
shortly after the arrival of the automobile at the police station, im-
poundment lot, or garage,5' but have not definitely established how
Chambers, the Court must have concluded that a car is mobile unless impounded.
Once impounded a car becomes immobile, as no private citizen can move it. 28 BAYLOR
L. REv., supra at 161. If this interpretation of Chambers is correct, then exigent cir-
cumstances did not exist in Chulengarian as there the car was impounded, and the
search thus was not reasonable. Some courts have followed this interpretation. People
v. Lorio, 546 P.2d 1254 (Colo. 1976) (defendant's car held in police custody, warrantless
search invalid as the car was not mobile); Maldonado v. State, 528 S.W.2d 234 (Tex.
Crim. App. 1975) (no exigent circumstances existed when car was held at fenced-in
police storage lot, as mobility factor gone). Contra, Commonwealth v. Maione, 227
Pa. Super. Ct. 239, 324 A.2d 556 (1974) (car impounded, but search conducted four
hours later upheld on mobility factor as there was a fleeting opportunity to search);
State v. Sanders, 266 So. 2d 79 (Dist. Ct. App. Fla. 1972) (although car was impounded
and defendant was in police custody, warrantless search upheld). The Maldonado
court distinguished Chambers because in that case "immobilization of the vehicle
while a search warrant was being obtained would have been an intrusion." 528 S.W.2d
at 240. In Maldonado the car had already been immobilized.
" Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42, 52 (1970).
5' See note 45 supra. The exact meaning of "immediate" is not clear. The search
in Chambers took place after the car was towed to the station house, but no exact time
sequence was given. However, in Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 (1971),
Justice White, the author of the majority opinion in Chambers, stated that Chambers
"contemplated some expedition in completing the searches so that automobiles could
be released and returned to their owners." Id. at 523 (White, J., dissenting). Coolidge,
however, involved warrantless searches commencing 11 and 14 months after seizure,
so the time when a warrantless search ceases to be "immediate" remains open to
speculation. One court's interpretation is that "immediate" in the Chambers context
should not be narrowly construed nor equated with "instantly," but should be read as
allowing the police a reasonable time in which to conduct a warrantless search. People
v. White, 68 Mich. App. 348, 242 N.W.2d 579 (1976) (upholding a warrantless search
commencing eighteen hours after impoundment). But see People v. Weaver, 35 Mich.
App. 504, 512, 192 N.W.2d 572, 575 (1971) (warrantless search commenced two days
after impoundment not valid; "immediate" means immediately upon arrival at station
house).
5, See, e.g., Gomez v. Beto, 471 F.2d 774 (5th Cir. 1973) (search held as soon as
automobile arrived at police station); Orricer v. Erickson, 471 F.2d 1204 (8th Cir. 1973)
(search a few hours after arrival at police station); Wood v. Crouse, 436 F.2d 1077 (10th
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much time may pass before a warrant must be obtained. 52
Clearly, however, the precise language of Chambers calls for an
immediate search upon delivering the automobile to the station,
53
and the twenty-four hour delay in Chulengarian may have been long
enough to require consideration of the time span involved. Instead,
the Fourth Circuit ignored that issue. In relying on White, the Fourth
Circuit based its decision on a case where probable cause existed, but
where there was no time-span problem in regard to the search,54 and
where mobility was still a factor as there was no impoundment.5
White's facts thus precisely fit the Chambers holding. Chulengarian,
however, is not so similar to Chambers, as there was a difference in
time span before the search, and exigent circumstances might not
have existed in Chulengarian 6 Therefore, further considerations
were involved in Chulengarian, and White arguably is not wholly
supportive. Indeed, in deciding Chulengarian the Fourth Circuit has
possibly weakened the necessity of the mobility factor in applying the
Chambers rule. Apparently, the court has found that an impounded
car is mobile for the purposes of Chambers. If an impounded car is
mobile it would seem difficult to envision any situation where an
automobile would not be considered mobile in the Fourth Circuit.
Likewise, Chulengarian has possibly extended the Chambers rule to
searches commencing long after arrival at the police station. When
coupled with the rationale that impounded automobiles are mobile,
the Fourth Circuit might uphold warrantless searches commenced
any number of days, or even weeks, after the impoundment. Only
future decisions concerning the time lapse between the impoundment
and the search will clarify the holding of Chulengarian.
Cir.), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 1010 (1971) (only twently minutes elapsed between initial
stop and search at county jail). But see United States v. McCormick, 502 F.2d 281 (9th
Cir. 1974) (if warrantless seizure of automobile valid, then subsequent search on follow-
ing day also valid); United States v. Gulledge, 469 F.2d 713 (5th Cir. 1972) (court
upheld a warrantless search commenced several days after arrival at the police sta-
tion). A prior Fourth Circuit decision held that "it matters not that the search is
conducted sometime later" after transporting the automobile to the station. United
States v. Chalk, 441 F.2d 1277, 1279 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 943 (1971). The
amount of time elapsed between the seizure and the search cannot be determined from
the facts given in Chalk.
52 See cases cited notes 50-51 supra.
See note 45 supra.
= The search in White took place approximately 30 to 45 minutes after arrival at
the police station. White v. State, 521 S.W.2d 255, 256 (Tex. Crim. App. 1974).
Comment, The Warrantless Automobile Search and Chambers v. Maroney, 28
BAYLOR L. REv. 151, 162 (1976).
" To meet the requirements for exigent circumstances, the automobile must be
mobile, and it arguably was not in Chulengarian. See notes 40 and 48 supra.
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C. Inaccuracy In Search Warrant Affidavits.
The question of when a defendant may attack the accuracy of
facts alleged in an affidavit for a search warrant, to challenge the
existence of probable cause, has never been decided by the Supreme
Court.' Consequently, different standards prevail among the cir-
cuits.2 Disagreement focuses on whether negligently stated material
misrepresentations in an affidavit require suppression of evidence
seized in the ensuing search.' In United States v. Lee,4 the Fourth
Circuit considered which standard should be utilized.
Lee was convicted for possession of a firearm in commerce.' A
federal agent obtained a warrant to search Lee's home, since his
girlfriend, Williams, had purchased firearms and had moved them in
interstate commerce. This was alleged to be a violation of federal law,
as the affidavit stated that Williams was a felon, having previously
been convicted of possession of a deadly weapon.' The warrant was
issued, and the subsequent search uncovered the guns. Lee was con-
victed for possession of the firearms since he had a sufficient interest
in the premises.7 On appeal Lee contended that Williams was not a
felon because her prior conviction was entered on a nolo contendere
I Rugendorf v. United States, 376 U.S. 528 (1964). In Rugendorf the petitioner
attacked the validity of the search warrant. The Court stated that when the warrant
is valid on its face and establishes "probable cause," the Court had never decided the
extent to which such an attack could be made. Id. at 531-32. The fact that the issue is
still unanswered by the Court is criticized in a dissent by Justice White to a denial of
certiorari in a case involving a challenge to the truthfulness of a warrant. North Caro-
lina v. Wrenn, 417 U.S. 973 (1974) (White, J., dissenting).
2 See text accompanying notes 13-23 infra. For a discussion of the different stan-
dards employed in state courts, see Note, Criminal Law-Search Warrants-Is An
Affidavit For A Search Warrant Infallible?, 28 BAYLOR L. REV. 760 (1976).
3 See text accompanying notes 13-23 infra.
540 F.2d 1205, 1207-09 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 97 S. Ct. 225 (1976).
18 U.S.C. app. § 1202(a) (1970) imposes a penalty on a felon who has received,
possessed, or transported any firearm in commerce.
See note 5 supra.
The ability of the government to prosecute Lee for possession, and his standing
to move to suppress the items seized in the search were not issues in the case because
of the Supreme Court's holding in Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257 (1960). The
Court held in Jones that standing to move to suppress can be predicated on two
different bases. First, the possession of seized goods itself gives standing, or otherwise
the government could punish for possession while denying all remedies. Id. at 263-64.
Second, a sufficient interest in the premises gives standing, and the defendant's inter-
est in the premises need not be one of ownership. Id. at 265-67. Lee would qualify under
either standing requirement as he was convicted on a possession charge, and the
searched house was apparently owned or rented by Lee. See 540 F.2d at 1207-08.
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plea.8 Lee argued that under applicable state law a nolo contendere
conviction had no effect outside of the case in which it was entered,'
so no probable cause existed and the warrant thus was invalid and
the search illegal. The Fourth Circuit did not reach the issue of
whether a nolo contendere plea will suffice as a prior conviction for
the purposes of the federal statute."0 Instead, the court found no
legally sufficient basis to allow Lee to go beneath the surface of the
affidavit and challenge the existence of probable cause."
The contested statement in the affidavit was an allegedly negli-
gent material misrepresentation. 2 Two different standards are pres-
ently employed in the courts of appeals to negligent material misre-
presentations. 3 In United States v. Carmichael, the Seventh Circuit
held that evidence should not be suppressed due to a negligent misre-
presentation in an affidavit, even if such misrepresentation was ma-
terial. A warrant would be invalid only if the affiant was reckless or
intentionally untruthful. 5 The Carmichael court reasoned that the
x Nolo contendere literally means "I will not contest it," and is tantamount to an
admission of guilt for the purposes of the case. All that remains is for the court to enter
judgment on the plea. 1 C. WRIGHT, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 177, at 385-86
(1969).
' See 540 F.2d at 1208. The defendant relied upon McCall v. Maryland, 9 Md.
App. 191, 193 n.4, 263 A.2d 19, 22 n.4 (1970), which noted that a nolo contendere plea
is not a conviction for the purposes of subsequent cases.
11 540 F.2d at 1208. Federal courts have often held that a nolo contendere plea is
regarded as a conviction for purposes of a criminal multiple offender statute. See, e.g.,
Sokoloff v. Saxbe, 501 F.2d 571, 574-75 (2d Cir. 1974); United States ex rel. Bruno v.
Reimer, 98 F.2d 92 (2d Cir. 1938). Courts are in general disagreement over the conse-
quences of a nolo contendere plea in subsequent civil proceedings. Annot., 89 A.L.R.2d
540, 604-05 (1963). See generally Comment, The Plea of Nolo Contendere, 25 MD. L.
REv. 227 (1965).
" 540 F.2d at 1208.
, The view that the statement was a negligent misrepresentation appears from
the decision as a whole. The Fourth Circuit held that only perjury or recklessness are
bases for an attack on the affidavit, and since no such attack was permitted in Lee, it
follows that at worst the statement was only negligently made. See id. at 1209. Negli-
gence in an assertion in an affidavit may be due to negligent personal investigation by
the affiant, too forecful a claim of evidence of reliability of an informer, reliance on an
informer when the situation warns the affiant to verify the information, or a negligent
misstatement of the informer's story. Kipperman, Inaccurate Search Warrant Affida-
vit As A Ground For Suppressing Evidence, 84 HARv. L. REV. 825, 831-32 (1971).
'1 See text accompanying notes 14-23 infra.
1 489 F.2d 983 (7th Cir. 1973).
I5 In Carmichael, a warrant was issued on the basis of an affidavit founded largely
on hearsay evidence supplied by a confidential informant. The Seventh Circuit held
that a defendant may go behind the face of an affidavit only when material and
intentional misrepresentations were made in the affidavit. Id. at 988. One rationale for
this holding was the assumption that whether a police officer acted innocently or
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exclusion of evidence is justified as deterring police misconduct, and
"good faith errors cannot be deterred."' 6 This standard has subse-
quently been adopted by the Sixth Circuit, 7 and the Eighth Circuit."1
By contrast, the Fifth Circuit consistently has employed a strict per
se rule whereby any material misrepresentation makes the warrant
invalid." This standard also has been utilized by the Tenth Circuit,"°
negligently is not determinable. Therefore, the dividing line as to whether an examina-
tion of a warrant's validity should be allowed is better placed at the point of police
recklessness or intentional misrepresentation. See id. at 989.
" Id. at 988.
,7 United States v. Luna, 525 F.2d 4 (6th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 965
(1976). See note 18 infra.
11 United States v. Marihart, 492 F.2d 897 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 827
(1974). This intentional falsity standard has not met with full approval by the com-
mentators. While quashing all warrants containing negligent misrepresentations would
not be beneficial to crime prevention, it does not necessarily follow that material
negligent misrepresentations should not be quashed. To suppress evidence when pro-
cured by negligent material misrepresentations would make the police investigate as
thoroughly as they would under a full-scale exclusionary rule. Kipperman, Inaccurate
Search Warrant Affidavits as a Ground for Suppressing Evidence, 84 HARv. L. REv.
825, 832 (1971). Since the police will not necessarily know which allegations in the
affidavit are material when they apply for the warrant, they will probably attempt to
collect as much evidence as possible in order to defend any attack upon the warrant.
In this manner negligence may be practically and not just theoretically deterred. See
id.
Likewise, the toleration of negligence condoned in Carmichael has been viewed as
unsupportable, since it might leave citizens at the mercy of the "whim or caprice" of
the police. Brinegar v. Untied States, 338 U.S. 160, 176 (1949). This criticism of
Carmichael is supported in Herman, Warrants for Arrest or Search: Impeaching the
Allegations of a Facially Sufficient Affidavit, 36 OHIO ST. L.J. 721, 750 (1975), where
the theory that police should not be held to the same standards as a magistrate is
attacked. The theory is founded on the basis that police have less training and need
to act quickly; Herman, however, asserts that the rationale is incorrect in three ways.
In a variety of cases the police proceed without a warrant, and draw their own
probable-cause inferences alone, but such actions are still governed by a standard of
reasonableness. Furthermore, in many situations a court clerk, who may in fact have
less training than the police, makes the judgment. See Shadwick v. City of Tampa,
407 U.S. 345 (1972) (court clerks may constitutionally determine probable cause, and
issue arrest warrants in municipal court). Finally, it is the government's fault that
important parts of the probable cause determination are entrusted to persons without
adequate training, and the government should not be allowed to use its own delin-
quency to defeat the protection of an individual's privacy. See Herman, supra at 750
n.132.
" See United States v. Thomas, 489 F.2d 664 (5th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 423
U.S. 844 (1975); United States v. Morris, 477 F.2d 657 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S.
852 (1973); United States v. Upshaw, 448 F.2d 1218 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405
U.S. 934 (1972).
2 United States v. Harwood, 470 F.2d 322 (10th Cir. 1972).
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and the District of Columbia Circuit."' The most direct Fourth Cir-
cuit response to this issue prior to Lee is King v. United States. 2 In
King, the Fourth Circuit stated in dictum that in federal courts false
statements made by the affiant will invalidate the warrant and
search.21 The Fourth Circuit had thus previously adopted a standard
which aligned with the Fifth Circuit's per se rule.
In Lee, however, the Fourth Circuit dismissed its prior dictum in
King as over-broad, 2 and held that the Fifth Circuit's strict per se
rule is too expansive.? The Fourth Circuit instead adopted the
Carmichael standard, and held that an attack on the affidavit will
be allowed only when perjury or reckless misrepresentation has oc-
curred. 21 In so doing, the Lee court found that to exclude probative
evidence where the inaccuracy was simply an innocent or negligent
one would serve no useful purpose.?
Due to the conflicting standards, Supreme Court determination
of this issue is desirable. Meanwhile, the courts of appeals probably
will continue to divide on the issue of attacks upon the accuracy of
search warrant affidavits. The issue involves a balancing of individ-
ual rights and the necessity for police investigation in criminal ac-
tivity.2 1 In Lee, the Fourth Circuit seemingly viewed the need for
police investigation as the slightly stronger consideration. The stan-
dard for the Fourth Circuit in inaccurate search warrant affidavit
problems is now clear, and the examination of the validity of those
affidavits has been limited to cases involving reckless or intentional
police misconduct.
D. Severance of Trials: Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure 8
and 13.
Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure delineates when
joinder of offenses and defendants is permissible.' Before joinder, the
22 United States v. Henderson, 17 F.R.D. 1 (D.D.C. 1954).
- 282 F.2d 398 (4th Cir. 1960).
2 Id. at 400 n.4.




21 See Herman, Warrants for Arrest or Search: Impeching the Allegations of a
Facially Sufficient Affidavit, 36 Omo ST. L.J. 721, 730-32, 750 (1975).
21 See Kipperman, Inaccurate Search Warrant Affidavits as a Ground for Sup-
pressing Evidence, 84 HARv. L. REv. 825, 832 (1971).
I FED. R. CRIM. P. 8 states in pertinent part:
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trial judge under Rule 14 may, at his discretion, sever defendants or
order separate trials of counts if a party will be prejudiced by joinder.
2
In United States v. Foutz,3 and United States v. Whitehead,4 the
Fourth Circuit reviewed the applicability of those rules.
The appellant in Foutz contended that the district court had
abused its discretion in not granting a severance.5 Foutz was con-
victed for two robberies of the same bank.' In the first robbery, one
man entered the front door of the bank, vaulted the tellers' counter
and took money from two cash drawers. He wore a turtleneck sweater
and a beret, and escaped by walking down a side street. Nearly three
months later the same bank was robbed by three men, with two
vaulting the tellers' counter and taking money from several cash
drawers. The third robbery wore a turtleneck sweater and wide-
brimmed hat, and held a gun on the bank employees. They all then
escaped in Foutz's car, down the same side street. No fingerprints
were found, the bank surveillance photographs did not picture Foutz,
and the employees could only testify that Foutz resembled one of the
robbers. Since the district court held that the offenses were of the
same or similar character,7 Foutz was charged with both robberies in
one indictment under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 8(a).1 His
motion for severance under Rule 14 was denied.
In 8(a) joinder cases, there are three ways in which a defendant
may be prejudiced. By the process of joinder, certain defenses may
be destroyed.' There is also a risk that the jury may cumulate the
(a) Two or more offenses may be charged in the same indictment or
information. . . if the offenses charged. . . are of the same or similar
character or are based on the same act or transaction or on two or more
acts or transactions connected together or constituting part of a com-
mon scheme or plan.
(b) Two or more defendants may be charged in the same indictment
or information if they are alleged to have participated in the same act
or transaction or in the same series of acts or transactions constituting
an offense or offenses.
FED. R. CRIM. P. 14 states that the court may order severance of defendants or
separate trials of counts, or any other appropriate relief, if a defendant or the govern-
ment is prejudiced by joinder of offenses or of defendants.
540 F.2d 733 (4th Cir. 1976).
539 F.2d 1023 (4th Cir. 1976).
540 F.2d at 735.
Foutz was convicted under 18 U.S.C. §§ 2 and 2113(a), (b), (d), and (f) (1970).
540 F.2d at 735.
540 F.2d at 735.
See note 1 supra.
In Cross v. United States, 335 F.2d 987 (D.C. Cir. 1964), the defendant was
charged with two counts of robbery. The court recognized that in this situation the
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evidence against the defendant.'0 Finally, the jury may conclude that
the defendant has a criminal disposition and thus unjustifiably find
him guilty of all offenses." In Foutz, the defendant may have been
prejudiced in the last manner.' 2 As the Fourth Circuit noted, how-
ever, when evidence of one offense would be admissible at a separate
trial for the other offense, the defendant suffers no prejudice if the
offenses are joined for trial.'3 Therefore, the threshold question when
determining whether the joinder was prejudicial to the defendant is
whether the evidence of one offense would be admissible at a trial for
the other offense.
One method by which evidence of other crimes can be introduced
at defendant's trial is the "signature" theory." The rationale behind
this theory is that other crimes committed by the defendant, which
contain the identical unique acts which are involved in the case on
trial, should be admissible to assist in identifying the defendant.' 5 In
Foutz, the government argued that the two robberies were so similar
that the "signature" theory applied, and evidence of one robbery
should thus be admissible at a separate trial for the other robbery.
Therefore, joinder of offenses under Rule 8(a) created no prejudice to
Foutz. The Fourth Circuit disagreed, however, and held that the facts
did not demonstrate two offenses similar enough to qualify under the
"signature" exception.'" By not qualifying under the signature excep-
tion, the evidence of one robbery would not be admissible at a sepa-
rate trial for the other robbery, and Foutz was therefore prejudiced.
defendant might have wanted to testify on one count but not the other. However, if
he had testified on one count he would have risked the possibility that any adverse
effects of his testimony would color the jury's consideration of both counts. Likewise,
if he remained silent on one count the jury might have questioned his express denial
of the other charge, thus forcing the defendant to testify on both counts. This situation
confounded the presentation of defenses, and the court found joinder to be prejudicial
under Rule 14. Id. at 989-91.
"* In Gregory v. United States, 369 F.2d 185 (D.C. Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 396 U.S.
865 (1969), the defendant was indicted for two robberies, one of which resulted in
murder. The court held that severance should have been granted as the danger existed
that the two offenses cumulated in the jurors' minds, thereby tending to prove guilt
for both offenses, and the evidence for one offense was so weak that its main usefulness
was to support the other robbery which resulted in murder. Id. at 189.
" 1 C. WRIGHT, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 222, at 437 (1969) [hereinafter
cited as WRIGHT].
'z 540 F.2d at 736.
, Id. at 736-37.
C. MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE § 190, at 449 (2d ed. 1972).
" McCormick states that the device used for the crime "must be so unusual and
distinctive as to be like a signature." Id.
,1 540 F.2d at 737-38.
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In reversing the district court's denial of severance, the Fourth
Circuit's strict reading of the similarity necessary to invoke the
"signature" exception accorded with previous case law. The cases
that have found the signature exception applicable have typically
involved either more bizarre and distinguishable incidents, 7 or a
strictly-followed routine. 8 Crimes involving nothing more than a sim-
ilarity in clothing, or general physical characteristics, however, are
not distinctive enough to come within the signature exception. 9 In
Foutz, the number of participants had changed, the roles assumed
were different, the mode of escape was different, and different items
of clothing were worn. Thus, the Fourth Circuit found that the rob-
beries were not sufficiently alike to apply the signature theory."0
Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure was considered
in more detail in United States v. Whitehead.2' Whitehead and Jack-
son were involved in a transfer of cocaine to a federal agent. Prior to
1" See United States v. Woods, 484 F.2d 127 (4th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S.
979 (1974) (nine children under defendant's care died from respiratory failure); People
v. Peete, 28 Cal. 2d 306, 106 P.2d 924, cert. denied, 329 U.S. 790 (1946) (two deaths
caused by bullets fired at close range, severing spinal cord at the neck). For further
commentary on the signature principle in general, and the above cases in particular,
see Note, Evidence: Admissibility of Evidence of Previous Crime: Instructions to Jury,
35 CALIF. L. REv. 131 (1947); Note, Evidence-Proof of Particular Facts-Evidence
That Defendant May Have Committed Similar Crimes Admissible To Prove Corpus
Delicti of Murder-United States v. Woods, 87 HAxv. L. Rv. 1074 (1974); Child
Abuse, Fourth Circuit Review, 31 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 207 (1974).
I" See United States v. Moody, 530 F.2d 809 (8th Cir. 1976) (two robberies carried
out in exactly the same fashion; woman ordered to rest room, forced to disrobe, and
rings stolen from victim's hand); United States v. McCray, 433 F.2d 1173 (D.C. Cir.
1970) (robberies of fur coats by man impersonating delivery man; receipts written out).
11 See United States v. Carter, 475 F.2d 349 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (no pattern of crimi-
nal conduct established by fact that man wore fur hat and carried pistol); Drew v.
United States, 331 F.2d 85 (D.C. Cir. 1964) (fact Lhat two robberies were conducted
by a black man wearing sunglasses not distinctive enough). The reason the common
features must be so exceptional is that without that requirement, the features could
be shared by numerous people, and thus would not be beneficial in identifying one
individual. Without the exceptionality requirement, the danger arises of implicating
the wrong individual. 2 J. WIOMORE, EVIDENCE § 411, at 385 (3d ed. 1940).
" The Foutz court also considered whether the pronouncement of concurrent sent-
ences mitigated any prejudice resulting from joinder. 540 F.2d at 738-39. See United
States v. Clayton, 450 F.2d 16, 19 (1st Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 975 (1972);
United States v. Adams, 434 F.2d 756, 760 n.13 (2d Cir. 1970). The Fourth Circuit
decided that prejudice against the defendant was not mitigated, stating that concur-
rent sentencing could not completely negate the prejudicial effect of a joint trial. 540
F.2d at 739. As an example, the court discussed the possibility that two convictions
instead of one may postpone parole eligibility. Id.
21 539 F.2d 1023 (4th Cir. 1976).
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that transaction, Jackson and one Meredith had sold cocaine to the
same federal agent. No evidence showed Whitehead to have been a
part of the Jackson-Meredith drug transaction. After Jackson was
convicted, Whitehead and Meredith were joined for trial and found
guilty.22 On appeal, the Fourth Circuit held that joinder was im-
proper, as Rule 8(b) does not provide for joinder of defendants for acts
of the same or similar character.?
Under Rule 13, a court may join defendants if they could have
been joined in a single indictment or information.24 To determine if
such joinder is possible, however, requires referring to Rule 8(b).2
Under Rule 8(b), defendants can be joined in a single indictment only
if they participated in the same act or transaction, or in the same
series of acts or transactions. Rule 8(b) does not refer to what Rule
8(a) terms offenses of "the same or similar character. ' ' 28 Conse-
quently, whether the acts were of the same or similar character argua-
bly is not a consideration when one indictment is being prepared for
two or more defendants. Courts have unanimously supported this
view, holding that Rule 8(b) must be read without reference to Rule
8(a).21
Regardless of the similarity of the crimes, Whitehead and Mere-
dith thus could have been joined properly only if they had partici-
pated in the same transaction, or series of transactions.28 As the
Fourth Circuit observed, the fact that Jackson participated in both
drug transactions did not establish any connection between White-
head's and Meredith's offenses.29 This lack of any connection between
the two offenses resembles a previous Fourth Circuit case, Ingram v.
United States.31 Ingram concerned two completely separate incidents
of police detection of two neighbors possessing non-taxed whiskey. As
2 Whitehead was convicted for distributing cocaine under 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1)
(1970).
" 539 F.2d at 1025. See note 1 supra.
21 FED. R. CraM. P. 13 provides in pertinent part that "[tihe court may order two
or more indictments or informations or both to be tried together if the offenses, and
the defendants if there is more than one, could have been joined in a single indictment
or information .. "
21 See note 1 supra.
2S See WRIGHT, supra note 11, § 144, at 319.
21 United States v. Bova, 493 F.2d 33, 35 (5th Cir. 1974); United States v. Eagles-
ton, 417 F.2d 11, 14 (10th Cir. 1969); Cupo v. United States, 359 F.2d 990, 992 (D.C.
Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1013 (1967); King v. United States, 355 F.2d 700, 704-
05 (lst Cir. 1966); see also WRIGHT, supra note 11, § 144, at 318.
2 FED. R. CRIM. P. 8(b). See note 1 supra.
2 United States v. Whitehead, 539 F.2d 1023, 1025 (4th Cir. 1976).
272 F.2d 567 (4th Cir. 1959).
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there was absolutely no connection between the two acts, and they
were not part of the same transaction or a series of transactions, the
Fourth Circuit held that joinder of the defendants was improper.3 '
This reading of Rules 13 and 8 is widely supported.
32
In Foutz and Whitehead the court's construction of Rules 8 and
13, comports with that of other jurisdictions. The Fourth Circuit re-
emphasized that joinder of offenses is entirely separate from joinder
of defendants, and the provisions allowing for one are not to be
imputed to the other. Rules 8(a) and 8(b), therefore, must be read
independently. Furthermore, when joinder of offenses has occurred,
the standard in the Fourth Circuit for determining prejudice, as
enunciated in Foutz, is whether evidence of each offense is admissible
at a trial for only one of the offenses committed. If so, then joinder
has not prejudiced the defendant. Finally, when considering admissi-
bility in a separate trial under the signature exception, Foutz restates
the need for extremely similar, possibly identical offenses.-4 Hence,
the court seems to agree with the proposition that exclusion of evi-
dence at a separate trial is favored over admission, as the emphasis
is on protecting defendants from a conviction based on prejudice.
5
The decision whether to join defendants involves consideration of
the necessity and advisability of severance. The expediency of sever-
ance often involves contemplation of the Supreme Court's decision in
Bruton v. United States.36 In Bruton, the defendant and one Evans
were convicted for armed postal robbery.3 Although Evans did not
testify, a postal inspector testified as to Evans' confession that he and
Bruton committed the robbery. The Supreme Court held that when
a co-defendant's hearsay statements are admitted at a joint trial,
limiting instructions, informing the jury to consider the evidence only
in connection with declarant's guilt and not that of his co-defendant,
are not an adequate safeguard. Because Bruton could not cross-
31 Id. at 569.
2 See United States v. Bova, 493 F.2d 33 (5th Cir. 1974) (trial for defendant's and
co-defendant's sale of narcotics joined with trial of co-defendant for unrelated sale;
joinder held improper under Rule 8(b)); Metheany v. United States, 365 F.2d 90 (9th
Cir. 1966) (defendant and co-defendant charged with fraudulent concealment from
trustee in bankruptcy; when neither charged with participating in the same acts, and
such conclusion could not be drawn from similar but separate allegation, under Rule
8(b), joinder improper).
- See text accompanying notes 17-20 supra; text accompanying notes 23 and 27
supra.
31 See text accompanying notes 17-20 supra.
3 C. MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE § 190, at 453-54 (2d ed. 1972).
- 391 U.S. 123 (1968).
37 18 U.S.C. § 2114 (1948) (current version at 18 U.S.C. § 2114 (1970)).
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examine the absent declarant, the Court found a violation of Bruton's
constitutional right to confrontation." The Fourth Circuit, in United
States v. Truslow,35 set out the procedure for courts to follow when
they receive notice"0 that hearsay evidence and confrontation difficul-
ties, as found in Bruton, might arise in a joint trial.
In Truslow, Brumfield, Davidson, and Truslow were convicted of
obstruction of justice,' and conspiring to obstruct justice.42 The ob-
struction took the form of shooting a government witness during the
investigation of possible criminal activity by a former Attorney Gen-
eral of West Virginia. The trial court held that the shooting incident
terminated the conspiracy,43 and the Bruton problem involved a sub-
sequent statement made by Davidson. A government witness testi-
fied that Davidson stated that by shooting a witness, he had "done a
job for Mr. Truslow. . . ."I' Davidson did not testify at trial,
however, and there was thus no way for Truslow to question the
statement. Although the trial court gave limiting instructions to the
jury, 1 the Fourth Circuit held there was a violation of the confronta-
tion clause under Bruton."5
Under Rule 14 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure," a
severance may be granted at the trial judge's discretion if prejudice
appears likely.'8 However, there are alternatives to severance or ad-
mission of prejudicial evidence. One alternative is for the court to
conduct an in camera inspection under Rule 14 of statements or
31 391 U.S. at 137. The Constitution provides that "[iln all criminal prosecutions,
the accused shall enjoy the right ... to be confronted with the witnesses against him;"
U.S. CONsT. amend VI. The basis for the holding in Bruton was the Court's doubt as
to the ability of the jury to follow the limiting instructions. If that doubt is reasonably
founded, and the trial court does no more than give limiting instructions, then, as in
the trial in Bruton, inadmissible hearsay evidence may be considered by the jury in
their determination of defendant's guilt.
' 530 F.2d 257 (4th Cir. 1975).
' In Truslow, the motion for severance stated that Bruton problems could easily
arise, so the trial judge did receive notice. 530 F.2d at 261.
11 18 U.S.C. § 1503 (1970).
4 18 U.S.C. § 371 (1970).
530 F.2d at 259.
" Id.
The practice of giving limiting instructions to the jury was the procedure fol-
lowed before the Bruton decision. See Delli Paoli v. United States, 352 U.S. 232, 236-
43 (1957).
" 530 F.2d at 260. See text accompanying note 38 supra.
See note 2 supra.
E.g., United States v. Crockett, 514 F.2d 64 (5th Cir. 1975).
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confessions secured by the government. 9 After the inspection, the
judge can decide how best to alleviate the prejudice. If necessary, he
may choose to exclude the entire statement," or only to delete that
portion of the statement which refers to co-defendants, against whom
the statement is inadmissible.5 The better view would seem to be
that these possibilities should first be considered, with severance
being utilized only as a last resort in case the alternatives are inade-
quate.5 In Truslow, the Fourth Circuit prescribed the in camera pro-
cedure and consideration of alternatives to severance when the trial
judge has knowledge that Bruton statements are likely to arise.53 The
court therefore reversed Truslow's conviction and ordered a new trial
with consideration of severance alternatives.
The procedure outlined by the Fourth Circuit in Truslow is lauda-
ble because it provides a timely consideration of the balance a trial
court must strike between judicial economy and rights of defen-
dants. " The Truslow court held that when the trial judge receives
notice of possible future Bruton problems, he should inquire into the
statements proposed to be used, and then decide the appropriate
procedure to follow to prevent Bruton violations. 5 The Truslow deci-
sion appears novel since while severance is universally viewed as
discretionary,56 and a Bruton violation as prejudicial, other circuits
have not expressly set out a procedure such as that developed in
Truslow. The procedure is advantageous, as severance is not neces-
sary in every Bruton-like case. Less drastic remedies may instead be
employed, thereby fostering judicial economy while still upholding
each individual's constitutional rights.
" FED. R. CRIM. P. 14 provides that "[iln ruling on a motion by a defendant for
severance the court may order the attorney for the government to deliver to the court
for inspection in camera any statements or confessions made by the defendants which
the government intends to introduce in evidence at the trial." Indeed, the rule was
amended in 1966 with this express procedure in mind. (Notes of Advisory Committee
on Rules, 1966 Amendment) FED. R. CRIM. P. 14. This procedure was specifically
recognized in Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123, 131-32 (1968).
" United States v. Gordon, 253 F.2d 177, 183 (7th Cir. 1958).
Kitchell v. United States, 354 F.2d 715, 718 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 384 U.S.
1011 (1966).
1' See United States v. Bozza, 365 F.2d 206 (2d Cir. 1966). See also Nelson v.
O'Neil, 402 U.S. 622, 636 (1971) (Marshall, J., dissenting); WRmGHT, supra note 11, §
224, at 454-56.
530 F.2d at 261-62 and n.3.
' See United States v. Donaway, 447 F.2d 940, 943 (9th Cir. 1971).
" 530 F.2d at 261-62.
See note 48 supra.
' See note 38 supra.
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E. The Effects of Trial Publicity on the Impartiality of Jurors.
The coverage of controversial trials by the news media has created
judicial problems in regard to trial publicity, focusing on whether the
right to a fair trial has been damaged by prejudicial publicity.' The
traditional conflict in trial publicity cases involves the competing
constitutional guarantees of a fair trial 2 and freedom of the press.3 As
the Supreme Court has held, however, freedom of the press "must
necessarily be subject to the maintenance of absolute fairness in the
judicial process."' The effect of trial publicity on the fairness of a trial
was considered by the Fourth Circuit in United States v. Morlangs
and United States v. Jones.'
In Morlang, the defendant was convicted for bribing the Director
of the Federal Housing Administration. The pre-trial publicity arose
because of a former West Virginia Governor's involvement in the
scheme.' Morlang attempted to waive a jury trial,8 claiming that the
adverse publicity would prejudice him in a jury trial. The prosecu-
tion, however, refused to consent to Morlang's waiver, and Morlang
was subsequently convicted On appeal, Morlang asserted that he
See Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333 (1966) (pervasive prejudicial publicity
denied petitioner his constitutional right to a fair trial); Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532
(1965) (televising of criminal trials over defendant's objection invalid as infringing on
right of due process). For a general discussion on the scope and effect of pre-trial
publicity, see Comment, Pre-Trial Publicity, 34 Mo. L. REv. 538 (1969). For Fourth
Circuit decisions on adverse publicity both before and during trial, see Effect of Ad-
verse Publicity, Fourth Circuit Review, 32 WAsH. & LEE L. REv. 489 (1975) [hereinafter
cited as Effect of Adverse Publicity]. A discussion of the Sheppard case appears in
Note, Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333 (1966)-Duty of Trial Judge to Protect
Accused From Prejudice, 62 Nw. U.L. REv. 89 (1967).
2 The Constitution provides "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy
the right to a... trial ... by an impartial jury ... ." U.S. CONsT. amend. VI.
The Constitution provides that "Congress shall make no law ... abridging the
freedom. . . of the press. . . ." U.S. CONsT. amend. I. The confict between the right
to a fair trial and freedom of the press is discussed by the Court in Estes v. Texas, 381
U.S. 532, 538-40 (1965).
Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532, 539 (1965).
531 F.2d 183 (4th Cir. 1975).
542 F.2d 186 (4th Cir. 1976).
Barron, a former governor of West Virginia, Morlang, and others were partners
in a partially illegal housing development plan. The FHA Director received a $2,000
bribe to hasten approval of the plan. 531 F.2d at 185-86.
" FED. R. CRiM. P. 23(a) provides that "[c]ases required to be tried by jury shall
be so tried unless the defendant waives a jury trial in writing with the approval of the
court and the consent of the government."
' Morlang was convicted for conspiracy to bribe and bribery under 18 U.S.C. §
371 (1970). 531 F.2d at 185.
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was denied a fair trial by the prosecution's refusal to approve his
request to be tried by a judge alone."
The waiver of a jury trial, as the Supreme Court held in Singer v.
United States," may be conditioned upon the prosecution's and
judge's consent. In Singer, defendant was convicted for thirty viola-
tions of the mail fraud statute. Singer offered to waive his right to
a jury trial to save time, but the government refused to consent. The
Supreme Court rejected Singer's argument that Article H, § 2, and
the sixth amendment of the Constitution 3 grant a right for trial by
judge alone if the defendant considers that to be to his advantage.
The Singer Court held that the Constitution did not bestow nor recog-
nize such a right. 4 Furthermore, since a defendant's sole constitu-
tional right concerning trial is to receive an impartial trial by jury, 5
to deny defendant's request would merely give him exactly what the
Constitution guarantees. Thus, the Court held that refusal to consent
to a no-jury request under Rule 23(a)" did not controvert any notions
of fair trial or due process. 7 In dictum, however, the Singer Court
recognized that there may be some situations in which the denial of
a defendant's waiver of a jury trial might result in an unfair trial. 8
While the Court did not indicate what those situations might be, the
petitioner's brief emphasized situations where "passion, prejudice
[or] public feeling," might render an impartial trial by jury impossi-
ble." Morlang contended that his trial came under a Singer excep-
tion, and that in denying his request for waiver, the trial judge either
abused his discretion or failed to use it at all. 0
531 F.2d at 186.
380 U.S. 24 (1965).
2 Id. at 25. See 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (1958) (current version at 18 U.S.C. § 1341
(1970)).
'1 Article III, § 2, of the Constitution provides that "[t]he trial of all Crimes,
except in Cases of Impeachment, shall be by jury ... " U.S. CONsT. art. III, § 2. For
the pertinent sixth amendment provisions, see note 2 supra.
" Singer v. United States, 380 U.S. 24, 26 (1965).
' See note 13 supra.
IS See note 8 supra.
'7 Singer v. United States, 380 U.S. 24, 36 (1965).
" Id. at 37.
" Id. at 37-38. The Court's decision in Singer has been interpreted as expressly
limited to its facts. That renders Singer as holding only that the "saving time" ratio-
nale for waiver of jury trial is not a circumstance which compelled the conclusion that
denial of the waiver would likely preclude an impartial jury. See Note, Singer v. United
States, 380 US. 24 (1965)-Inability to Waive Jury Trial in the Federal Courts, 60 Nw.
U.L. REV. 722, 729 (1966). That interpretation leaves open the question of when waiver
should be permitted.
" 531 F.2d at 186-87.
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The Fourth Circuit refuted Morlang's contentions on two bases.
First, the burden was upon the defendant to rebut the presumption
of the impartiality of the prospective jurors.21 Morlang did not meet
this burden, as he offered no evidence establishing actual prejudice
on the part of any of the prospective jurors, and a mere showing of
adverse publicity cannot of itself establish prejudice or partiality."
Second, the Fourth Circuit noted that the trial court questioned ju-
rors as to their knowledge of the case, and ensured that those who had
read the news accounts would be able to decide the case solely on the
evidence received in court.?
The handling of the publicity problem by inquiries to the jurors
follows the procedure set out by the Supreme Court in Irvin v.
Dowd.2 14 The Court in Irvin perceived that, because of the pervasive-
21 Id. at 187. See Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1878). In Reynolds the
Court stated that:
[t]he affirmative of the issue is upon the challenger. Unless he shows
the actual existence of such an opinion in the mind of the juror as will
raise the presumption of partiality, the juror need not necessarily be
set aside, and it will not be error in the court to refuse to do so.
Id. at 157. See also United States ex rel. Darcy v. Handy, 351 U.S. 454, 462 (1956).
2 E.g., Northern Calif. Phar. Ass'n v. United States, 306 F.2d 379 (1962), cert.
denied, 371 U.S. 862 (1962) (allegation of adverse publicity without a showing of juror
bias not sufficient to warrant a change of venue); Blumenfield v. United States, 284
F.2d 46, 51 (8th Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 365 U.S. 812 (1961) (mere presence of adverse
publicity does not per se establish proof of prejudice). The defendant in Morlang relied
upon the ABA STANDARDS FOR FAiR TRIAL AND FREE PRESS § 3.3 (1968), which state that
in those jurisdictions where the defendant does not have an absolute right to waive a
jury, the defendant's waiver should be permitted when there "is reason to believe that,
as a result of the dissemination of potentially prejudicial material, the waiver is re-
quired to increase the likelihood of a fair trial." Id. The Fourth Circuit in Morlang
indicated that a mere showing of extensive publicity was not sufficient to show that a
non-jury trial would increase the likelihood of a fair trial. 531 F.2d at 187 n.10.
3 531 F.2d at 187. Courts have generally followed this polling procedure. See Irvin
v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717, 724 (1961); Silverthorne v. United States, 400 F.2d 627, 635-40
(9th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 1022 (1971); Welch v. United States, 371 F.2d
287, 290 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 957 (1966); United States v. Milanovich,
303 F.2d 626, 629-30 (4th Cir. 1962). But cf. United States ex rel. Doggett v. Yeager,
472 F.2d 229, 239 (3d Cir. 1973), holding that in some cases "a juror's statement that
the adverse publicity will not influence him is not sufficient automatically to qualify
him as impartial." The cases to which the Yeager court referred in that statement,
Turner v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 466 (1965), and Rideau v. Louisiana, 373 U.S. 723 (1963),
contained a much higher degree of prejudice that that involved in Morlang and the
cases cited supra. In Turner, two deputy sheriffs, who were also the principal prosecu-
tion witnesses, acted as attendants for the jurors during trial, and were closely asso-
ciated with the jurors throughout the trial. 379 U.S. at 466-68. In Rideau, a local
television station broadcast a film made at the sheriff's office of defendant's interroga-
tion and admission of criminal acts. 373 U.S. at 724.
24 366 U.S. 717 (1961).
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ness of the news media, jurors almost always will have read of and
formed an opinion on a publicized case.2 Hence, to hold that this
preconceived opinion sufficiently rebuts the presumption of juror
impartiality would set an impossible standard.26 The Court held that
a more realistic standard would be to determine whether the juror can
repress his preconceived opinion, and instead render a verdict based
only on the evidence produced in court.Y The Fourth Circuit adopted
this rationale in Morlang, and found that there was no manifest error
in the district court's procedure during voir dire.2 The defendant
failed to rebut the presumption of impartiality, and the trial judge
adequately ensured that the jury was fair and impartial. 29 Therefore,
the Fourth Circuit found no sufficient reason for Morlang to come
within any exception to Singer, and further found no abuse of discre-
tion.
Since the Morlang court did not determine the scope and pro-
priety of the Singer exception, when and whether the denial of a
waiver of jury trial subjects the defendant to a biased jury is still an
open question in the Fourth Circuit. What the Fourth Circuit did
hold in Morlang, in line with federal law," was that adverse publicity
alone cannot warrant a conclusion of juror partiality. To show a trial
tainted by publicity, the defendant must introduce evidence of actual
juror prejudice.3 ' Likewise, courts of appeals will uphold voir dire
procedures which determine whether a potential juror who has been
exposed to the publicity is able to divorce himself from preconcep-
tions and decide the case solely on the evidence in court. If such
procedures are followed in the Fourth Circuit, no abuse of discretion
by the trial judge will occur.
The Fourth Circuit determined the effects of both pre-trial and in-
Id. at 722.
Id. at 723.
2 Id. For subsequent refinements on the Irvin procedure in cases involving a high
degree of prejudice, see United States ex rel. Doggett v. Yeager, 472 F.2d 229, 239 (3d
Cir. 1973).
21 531 F.2d at 187. See Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1878). The Court
in Reynolds held that "[t]he finding of the trial court upon [the impartiality] issue
ought not to be set aside by a reviewing court, unless the error is manifest." Id. at 156.
The Irvin rationale has been adopted throughout the circuits. See, e.g., United States
ex rel. Rosenberg v. Mancusi, 445 F.2d 613 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 956
(1972); Margoles v. United States, 407 F.2d 727 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 833
(1969).
" 531 F.2d at 187.
" See cases cited note 22 supra.
1' E.g., United States v. Morlang, 531 F.2d 183, 187 (4th Cir. 1975).
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trial publicity in United States v. Jones." The defendants were in-
dicted for conspiracy to violate the narcotics laws of the United
States, and for possession with intent to distribute heroin.3 Before
the trial commenced they moved for a continuance" due to pre-trial
publicity. Motions for continuance often have been made in such
situations in the hope that added time will allow the prejudicial
effects of adverse publicity to dissolve.? To determine if any preju-
dice had developed due to the adverse publicity, the trial court, at
voir dire, asked the prospective jurors if they had seen or heard any
publicity about the trial. Only eight of the prospective jurors had read
or heard of the defendants, and they were excused .3 Thus, the trial
court found that no juror had been influenced by any pre-trial public-
ity, and therefore the court denied the motion for continuance.3 7 On
appeal, the Fourth Circuit found no error in the denial of the mo-
tion.3
The defendants in Jones also repeatedly moved for a mistrial due
to newspaper publicity during the trial. The jury had not been
sequestered, and apparently there had been newspaper accounts pub-
lishing parts of the testimony admitted at trial. 9 Because of such
publicity, the defendants claimed that the trial judge was in error for
failing to ascertain whether the jury had read or heard the accounts."
On appeal, the Fourth Circuit, in accord with past practices, held
that the threshold question was whether the publicity was
"substantial prejudicial material."'" Only after that determination
32 542 F.2d 186 (4th Cir. 1976).
Id. at 192-93. See 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) & 846 (1970).
3' FED. R. CRIM. P. 50, under which a request for a continuance must be brought,
provides that "[t]he district courts may provide for placing criminal proceedings upon
appropriate calendars. Preference shall be given to criminal proceedings as far as
practicable."
3 C. WRIGHT, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 832, at 334 (1969).
:' 542 F.2d at 193.
1 Id. at 194. Excusing veniremen who have prior knowledge of the defendant's
activities is a common remedy. See United States v. Thaggard, 477 F.2d 626, 630 (5th
Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1064 (1973); United States v. Medlin, 353 F.2d 789, 792
(6th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 973 (1966). Further, continuances are rarely
granted on this ground. See 3 C. WRIGHT, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 832, at
334 (1969).
31 542 F.2d at 194.
Id. at 196. See text accompanying note 48 infra.
' 542 F.2d at 194.
" Id. The Fourth Circuit had previously held, in United States v. Hankish, 502
F.2d 71, 77 (4th Cir. 1974), that the judge may decline to poll the jurors unless there
is a "substantial reason to fear prejudice." See also United States v. Armocida, 515
F.2d 29, 49 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 858 (1975).
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would the Fourth Circuit inquire into whether the district court had
followed the appropriate procedure set out in United States v.
Hankish12 In Hankish, the Fourth Circuit held that when prejudicial
information might have been exposed to the jury, the trial court must
ask whether any of the jurors have read or heard the publicity."
Those jurors who reply affirmatively must then be individually exam-
ined by the court to determine the complete effect of the publicity."
The judge should then decide what curative measures will ensure a
fair trial.45
In determining whether substantial prejudice exists, courts often
have used a test of whether the publicity could be admitted at trial."
If not, then the publicity, under the Fourth Circuit's vocabulary, is
held to be substantial prejudicial material.47 The publicity com-
42 502 F.2d 71, 76-78 (4th Cir. 1974). In Hankish, the defendant was charged with
stealing an interstate shipment of beer under 18 U.S.C. § 659 (1970) (prosecution for
stolen interstate shipments of freight), knowingly transporting stolen goods under 18
U.S.C. § 2314 (1970), and conspiracy. While the trial was in progress, a newspaper
published an article calling Hankish a "rackets figure," and reported on the operation
of a multistate theft ring Hankish allegedly directed. Id. at 76. That day, the defense
attorney requested the judge to question the jurors to determine if any of the jurors
had read the article. The judge refused to do so, and the Fourth Circuit held that was
error, because the highly prejudicial newspaper article may have influenced the jury's
verdict. Id. at 76. For a discussion of Hankish, see Effect of Adverse Publicity, supra
note 1.
11 502 F.2d at 77.
44 Id.
Is The jury polling procedure to detect possible preconceptions was adopted by the
Fourth Circuit from Margoles v. United States, 407 F.2d 727, 730 (7th Cir.), cert.
denied, 396 U.S. 833 (1969). By adopting the Margoles procedure, the Fourth Circuit
in Hankish rejected the strict compulsory change of venue procedure recommended by
the American Bar Association. 502 F.2d at 77. See ABA STANDARDS, FAIR TRIAL AND
FREE PRESS § 3.5(f) (1968); Effect of Adverse Publicity, supra note 1, at 495.
Instead, under the procedure used by the Fourth Circuit, the trial judge deter-
mines the extent and effect of the publicity, and exhausts other possibilities "before
aborting a trial." 502 F.2d at 77. These other possibilities consist of the voir dire
procedure to determine if there has been any exposure of the jurors to the prejudicial
publicity. If so, further alternatives to mistrial can be cautionary instructions, or the
excusing of a juror. Id. Thus, by adopting the Margoles procedure the Fourth Circuit
has additional remedies that it may employ in alleviating prejudicial trial publicity.
Is E.g., United States v. Thomas, 463 F.2d 1061, 1063-64 (7th Cir. 1972); United
States v. Hyde, 448 F.2d 815, 849 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1058 (1972).
,1 Publicity has been held to be substantial prejudicial material and inadmissible
at trial in the following: Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333 (1966) (publicity declared
defendant's guilt in multiple newspaper articles); United States v. Pomponio, 517 F.2d
460, 462-63 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1015 (1975) (publicity published accounts
of other pending charges attributable to defendant); United States v. Hankish, 502
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plained of in Jones, which consisted of accurate condensed state-
ments of admitted testimony,"8 was not substantial prejudicial mate-
rial. Because the newspaper accounts contained only evidence admit-
ted at trial, they obviously could pass the admissibility test. Since
no substantial prejudicial material was involved in the Jones' public-
ity, the Fourth Circuit upheld the trial judge's refusal to interrogate
the jury as to whether they had read the newspaper accounts.
The Jones decision further solidifies the Fourth Circuit's position
regarding trial publicity as found in Hankish. Jones afforded some
insight into what the Fourth Circuit considers substantial prejudicial
material. The Jones court also indicated that it will strictly adhere
to the admissibility test.49 Jones asserted that when evidence of an
obviously admissible nature is publicized by the media, the parties
may not successfully complain of prejudicial publicity. Furthermore,
under those circumstances, any request to the trial court for juror
interrogation to determine if any prejudicial effect has occurred need
not be granted. Apparently, the clear-cut determination of admissi-
bility will govern the Fourth Circuit's future decisions on publicity
during trial.
F. Merger of Sentencing Under the Use and Carrying of a
Firearm Statute.
In determining whether two offenses will merge,1 courts have re-
lied on statutory interpretation2 when applicable, and on a considera-
tion of the essential elements of the offense.' Thus, the Supreme
F.2d 71, 76 (4th Cir. 1974) (publicity pinpointed defendant as ringleader and director
of a racketeering outfit).
1 542 F.2d at 196.
1' The test requiring determination of admissiblity has been consistently utilized
by the Fourth Circuit. See United States v. Jones, 542 F.2d 186 (4th Cir. 1976); United
States v. Pomponio, 517 F.2d 460 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1015 (1975); United
States v. Hankish, 502 F.2d 71 (4th Cir. 1974).
Merger of offenses should occur when the relationship between offenses suggests
that multiple punishment was not intended. In making that determination, one rule
of construction is that one offense is included in another offense "if violation of the
second always involves violation of the first." Note, Twice In Jeopardy, 75 YALE L.J.
262, 318 (1965). Under this inclusion rule, the second offense should merge into the
first. For example, larceny merges into robbery, fornication merges into rape, and
being intoxicated on a public highway merges into driving a vehicle on a public high-
way while intoxicated. See Kirchheimer, The Act, The Offense and Double Jeopardy,
58 YAm L.J. 513, 517-18 (1949).
2 Prince v. United States, 352 U.S. 322 (1957).
Pereira v. United States, 347 U.S. 1, 9 (1953) (causing bank to mail letter
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Court has relied on statutory interpretation and legislative history
in construing the effects of multiple offenses under the Federal Bank
Robbery Act.4 Likewise, once two offenses have been deemed sepa-
rate, the Supreme Court has considered the respective elements of
both crimes to determine the appropriateness of merger.5 In that
consideration, the focus is on whether the proof of one offense neces-
sarily establishes all elements of the other offense.' If so, the offenses
merge.
In United States v. Crew,7 the Fourth Circuit employed both legis-
lative history and the consideraton of the elements of each offense to
determine whether merger was appropriate. Crew was convicted of
armed bank robbery,' willfully using a firearm during the commission
of a felony,' and willfully and unlawfully carrying a firearm. 0 Crew
pursuant to a scheme to defraud, a violation of the mail fraud statute, 18 U.S.C. §
1341 (1948) (current version at 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (1970)), was a separate offense from
causing a fraudulently obtained check to be transported by a bank in interstate com-
merce under 18 U.S.C. § 2314 (1948) (current version at 18 U.S.C. § 2314 (1970)), even
if both offenses arise from a single act); Morgan v. Devine, 237 U.S. 632, 641 (1915)
(breaking into a post office is a separate offense from stealing Post Office Department
property); United States v. Cedar, 437 F.2d 1033, 1036 (9th Cir. 1971) (stealing, pur-
loining, and knowingly converting to one's own use things of value of United States in
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 641 (1970) is a separate offense from unlawfully cutting and
destroying fir trees growing on United States land reserved for public use under 18
U.S.C. § 1853 (1970)).
Prince v. United States, 352 U.S. 322 (1957). See text accompanying notes 33-
37 infra.
See cases cited note 3 supra.
6 United States v. Cedar, 437 F.2d 1033, 1036 (9th Cir. 1971); see Morgan v.
Devine, 237 U.S. 632, 641 (1915). In regard to merger and double jeopardy, the federal
courts have followed what is referred to as the "distinct elements" test formulated in
Gavieres v. United States, 220 U.S. 338, 342 (1911). The test holds that as a single
offense may violate two statutes, if each statute requires proof of an additional fact
not required by the other, an acquittal or conviction under either statute does not
exempt defendant from prosecution under the other. See Note, Twice in Jeopardy, 75
YALE L.J. 262, 273 n.52 (1965).
7 538 F.2d 575 (4th Cir.), cert. deneid, 97 S. Ct. 144 (1976).
18 U.S.C. § 2113(a) (1970) provides that whoever takes or attempted to take
property or money from a bank, credit unions, or savings and loan association by force
or violence shall be fined not more than $5,000 or imprisoned not more than twenty
years, or both. 18 U.S.C. § 2113(d) (1970) provides that whoever commits or attempts
to commit a violation of subsection (a), and in so doing assaults any person, or puts
in jeopardy the life of another person by use of a dangerous weapon, shall be fined not
more than $10,000 or imprisoned not more than twenty-five years, or both.
18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1) (1970) provides that whoever uses a firearm in the commis-
sion of any felony shall, in addition to punishment for commission of the felony, be
imprisoned for not less than one year nor more than ten years.
1O 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(2) (1970) provides that whoever carries a firearm during the
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appealed, claiming that while the charges of using and carrying a
firearm set forth separate offenses when the underlying felony makes
no statutory provision for use of a firearm," those charges do not set
forth a separate crime when the related offense has such a statutory
provision.'
2
The Fourth Circuit refuted Crew's contention and held that the
unlawful carrying or use of a firearm" established a separate offense
from the armed robbery offense. The statute proscribing the carry-
ing or use of a firearm during the commission of a felony was promul-
gated as part of the Gun Control Act of 1968,15 which was designed
to combat the increasing use of firearms in the United States. 6 Dur-
ing congressional debate over the Act, both houses of Congress specif-
ically provided for this legislation aimed at those who use guns while
committing a felony. 7 While the language of the statute would seem
to apply to any underlying federal felony, 8 it is arguable that applica-
tion of the statute to a crime already involving use of a dangerous
weapon would place the defendant in double jeopardy. The rationale
of the argument would be that the federal armed bank robbery stat-
ute9 already imposes a greater penalty than that imposed by the
commission of any felony shall, in additon to punishment for commission of the felony,
be imprisoned for not less than one year nor more than ten years.
1 In the following cases, the use or carrying of a firearm was considered to be a
separate crime from the related felony, and in each case the related felony did not
involve any use of a weapon or firearm. United States v. Soria, 519 F.2d 1060 (5th Cir.
1975) (related offense was possession of marijuana with intent to distribute); United
States v. Ramirez, 482 F.2d 807 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1070 (1973) (related
offense was distribution and possession with intent to distribute cocaine); United
States v. Virgil, 458 F.2d 385 (10th Cir. 1972) (related offense was a violation of
narcotics laws).
"S United States v. Crew, 538 F.2d 575, 577 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 97 S. Ct. 144
(1976).
' See notes 9-10 supra.
I 538 F.2d at 577.
" 18 U.S.C. §§ 921-928 (1970); H.R. REP. No. 1577, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 7,
reprinted in [1968] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 4410. See also Zimring, Firearms
and Federal Law: The Gun Control Act of 1968, 4 J. LEGAL STuD. 133, 148-57 (1975).
"1 The General Statement given for the Act in H.R. REP. No. 1577, 90th Cong.,
2d Sess. 7, reprinted in [1968] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 4410, 4412, mentions
that "[t]he increasing rate of crime and lawlessness and the growing use of firearms
in violent crime clearly attest to a need to strengthen Federal regulation of interstate
firearms traffic."
11 For a brief review of the legislative history of the Gun Control Act of 1968 see
United States v. Sudduth, 457 F.2d 1198, 1199-1200 (10th Cir. 1972).
" See notes 9 and 10 supra.
J 18 U.S.C. § 2113(d) (1970). For armed bank robbery the penalty is a fine of not
more than $10,000 or imprisonment for not more than 25 years, or both.
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federal bank robbery offense.? Hence, the defendant has already been
punished for the use or carrying of a firearm, and a further imposition
of punishment for using or carrying a firearm during the commission
of an armed bank robbery would possibly create an unconstitutional
double punishment." The persuasiveness of this argument in federal
courts is not entirely clear, however, as only two circuits, the Fourth
2
and the Fifth," have considered the applicability of the statute pro-
scribing the use and carrying of firearms to the federal armed bank
robbery statute. Although this particular double jeopardy argument
was not raised in either circuit, both circuits would presumably reject
the argument, as they held that the use or unlawful carrying of a
firearm during the commission of a felony is a separate offense from
armed bank robbery, and therefore the defendant may be prosecuted
for both.24 Other circuits have not decided the issue.?
The Crew court further supported its decision by pointing out the
language difference in each statute. While a firearm is necessary for
a violation of the use or unlawful carrying of a firearm offense, only
a dangerous weapon or device is required for a violation of the armed
bank robbery statute."5 This language variation led the court to hold
that different elements of proof are required for these offenses.2 A
dangerous weapon need not necessarily be the firearm or explosive
device required by the Gun Control Act,2 and thus the proof of the
" 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a) (1970). For bank robbery the penalty is a fine of not more
than $5,000 or imprisonment for not more than 20 years, or both.
2" U.S. CONST. amend V. "[N]or shall any person be subject for the same offense
to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb." For a more detailed discussion on the merits
of this kind of argument, see Note, Commonwealth v. Hermankevich, Section (B) of
the Pennsylvania Deadly Weapons Act, and Multiple Punishment, 31 U. Prrr. L. REv.
476 (1970).
12 United States v. Crew, 538 F.2d 575 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 97 S. Ct. 144 (1976).
" Perkins v. United States, 526 F.2d 688 (5th Cir. 1976).
24 United States v. Crew, 538 F.2d 575, 578 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 97 S. Ct. 144
(1976); Perkins v. United States, 526 F.2d 688, 690 (5th Cir. 1976).
2 There are many cases involving armed bank robbery with a firearm where no
prosecution for the use or carrying of the firearm has occurred. See, e.g., United States
v. Fleming, 504 F.2d 1045 (7th Cir. 1974); United States v. Short, 493 F.2d 1170 (9th
Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1000 (1974). However, it is not determinable if those
omissions were merely due to a decision not to prosecute on those counts, or whether
the prosecution possibly felt that the courts might strike down such an attempt on
double punishment grounds.
2 538 F.2d at 577.
v Id.
2 Lye has been held to be a dangerous weapon, Tatum v. United States, 110 F.2d
555 (D.C. Cir. 1940), as have even shoes, Medlin v. United States, 207 F.2d 33 (D.C.
Cir. 1953), cert. denied, 347 U.S. 905 (1954). Furthermore, the California "Dangerous
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armed bank robbery offense in Crew did not necessarily establish all
elements of the use or carrying of a firearm offense.
Crew's second contention involved an interpretation of just the
use and carrying of a firearm statute. Crew argued that separate
sentences should not be imposed for use of a firearm during a felony2
and for carrying a firearm during a felony." At trial the use of the
firearm was the only evidence adduced to show the offense of
"carrying," with the result that a single act was proof of two offenses
set forth in the same subsection of the statute."' Regarding a similar
situation, the Supreme Court has held that the lesser-included of-
fense merges into the other offense.32 In Prince v. United States," the
Supreme Court construed the Federal Bank Robbery Actu so that
the two offenses under that statute of bank robbery" and unlawful
entry" merged for punishment purposes if a bank robbery had been
successfully completed.37 The Fourth Circuit followed the same prin-
ciple in United States v. Atkinson.- In Atkinson the defendant was
convicted of possession of heroin with intent to distribute,39 and of
distribution of heroin." On appeal, the Fourth Circuit held that while
the single act was proof of two offenses, Congress did not intend to
increase the maximum sentence when both offenses were violations
of the same subsection of the statute."'
Weapons' Control Law," CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 12000-12094 (West 1970) provides felony
punishment for anyone who possesses a blackjack, metal knuckles, sandbag, dagger,
and various other instruments. CAL. PENAL CODE § 12020 (West 1970). See also, Com-
ment, A Review of California's Dangerous Weapons Law, 1 Cam. Jusr. J. 45 (1976).
29 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1) (1970). See note 9 supra.
18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(2) (1970). See note 10 supra.
31 538 F.2d at 578.
Prince v. United States, 352 U.S. 322 (1957).
SId.
31 18 U.S.C. § 2113 (1948) (current version at 18 U.S.C. § 2113 (1970)).
18 U.S.C. § 2113(a) (1948) (current version at 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a) (1970)).
"Id.
3 In Prince v. United States, 352 U.S. 322 (1957), defendant was convicted for
robbery and for entering the bank with intent to commit a felony under 18 U.S.C. §
2113(a) (1948) (current version at 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a) (1970)). The Court stated that
the wording of the Act implied that the unlawful entry provision was designed to cover
the situation when an entry is made for purposes of robbery, but the robbery is then
frustrated for some reason before the crime is completed. Therefore, if the robbery is
successfully carried out, the lesser included offense of intent to commit a felony is
merged into the robbery offense. 352 U.S. at 328.
512 F.2d 1235 (4th Cir. 1975); United States v. Curry, 512 F.2d 1299 (4th Cir.),
cert. denied, 423 U.S. 832 (1975).
11 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) (1970).
' Id.
, United States v. Atkinson, 512 F.2d 1235, 1240 (4th Cir. 1975). Under this
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construction, if no distribution had taken place Atkinson could only be charged with
the intent crime. If distribution had occurred, Atkinson could be charged only with
distribution, not both crimes. There will thus be no circumstances where both crimes
can be charged for one act. In an analogous situation, the Fourth Circuit has also
recently held that one may not be convicted for both robbery and possession of stolen
money under 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a) and (c) (1970), as a result of a single occurrence.
Phillips v. United States, 518 F.2d 108 (4th Cir. 1975), vacated and remanded, 424 U.S.
961, modified, 538 F.2d 586 (4th Cir. 1976).
Phillips followed the Supreme Court's holding in Milanovich v. United States, 365
U.S. 551 (1961), where the Court held that a defendant could not be convicted for both
stealing and receiving the same property under 18 U.S.C. § 641 (1948) (current version
at 18 U.S.C. § 641 (1970)). 365 U.S. at 553-54. For discussion of Phillips and
Milanovich, see Evidentiary Bar in Successive Prosecutions, Fourth Circuit Review,
33 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 538 (1976). Likewise, Phillips was in accord with the Court's
holding in Heflin v. United States, 358 U.S. 415 (1959), where the Court held that a
defendant may not be convicted for robbery and receiving stolen goods under 18 U.S.C.
§ 2113(c) and (d) (1948) (current version at 18 U.S.C. § 2113(c) and (d) (1970)). The
Court felt that Congress' purpose was not to "pyramid penalties for lesser offenses,"
358 U.S. at 419, and that "Congress was trying to reach a new group of wrongdoers,
not to multiply the offense of the bank robbers themselves." Id. at 420. Furthermore,
the Court in Heflin commented upon the Prince decision and stated that "we resolve
an ambiguity in favor of lenity when required to determine the intent of Congress in
punishing multiple aspects of the same criminal act." Id. at 419.
The Supreme Court's latest decision in this area, United States v.Gaddis, 424 U.S.
544 (1976), dealt with the remedy to be used when multiple convictions result under
the Federal Bank Robbery Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2113 (1970). Gaddis was convicted for bank
robbery and for possessing the proceeds of the same theft under 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a)
and (c) (1970). The Court reiterated that under Heflin a defendant cannot receive
separate convictions for these two offenses. The Court then held that any error involved
in the multiple convictions may be corrected by vacating the conviction and sentence
for possession of stolen funds, thus rendering a new trial unnecessary. 424 U.S. at 549.
The Fourth Circuit has since considered the applicability of the Gaddis remedy in
several cases. See Baugh v. United States, 540 F.2d 1245 (4th Cir. 1976) (defendant
convicted of possessing stolen money under 18 U.S.C. § 2113(c) (1970) and transporting
stolen money across state lines under 18 U.S.C. § 2314 (1970); Gaddis remedy not
applicable as these are not mutually exclusive offenses but are complementary);
United States v. Sellers, No. 74-1683 (4th Cir. Sept. 2, 1976), modifying 520 F.2d 1281
(4th Cir. 1975) (when defendant charged for both theft and possession under 18 U.S.C.
§ 2113 (1970), correct procedure is for the jury to consider the theft charge first, and
then only consider the possession charge if there is insufficient evidence to support
theft charge; however, when two convictions are improperly received, any resulting
error is harmless, as under Gaddis the conviction on the possession count is reversed);
Phillips v. United States, 538 F.2d 586 (4th Cir. 1976), modifying 518 F.2d 108 (4th
Cir. 1975) (conviction of possession of stolen money under 18 U.S.C. § 2113(c) (1970)
upheld under Gaddis, and introduction of evidence relating to bank robbery after an
acquittal on that charge in a separate trial held not prejudicial). See also United States
v. McDaniel, disposition recorded 530 F.2d 971 (4th Cir. 1975) (admitted thief also
convicted of possession under 18 U.S.C. § 659 (1970); held no error resulted as defen-
dant not punished for both crimes).
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The same situation existed in Crew, as the offense of using a
firearm during the commission of a felony encompasses the offense
of carrying a firearm during the commission of a felony: Generally,
in circumstances where a single act encompasses two offenses under
the same statute section or subsection, the statutes have not been
read as providing punishment for both offenses." Furthermore, the
proof of the "using" offense necessarily established the "carrying"
offense."3 Therefore, the Fourth Circuit held in Crew that the offense
of "carrying" the firearm merged into the offense of "using" the fire-
arm, and dismissed Crew's sentence on the "carrying" count."
In Crew, the Fourth Circuit reaffirmed standard principles in re-
gard to one act entailing two offenses under the same statute.4 1 Crew,
however, presented a novel point in the construction of the use and
unlawful carrying statute, as the underlying felony itself involved a
use of some kind of weapon. Prior convictions based upon the statute
proscribing the use or unlawful carrying of a firearm during the com-
mission of a felony had generally involved violations of narcotics laws,
where no weapon was involved in the underlying offense."8 In Crew,
the Fourth Circuit established that the crime of the use or carrying
of a firearm when committing a felony is applicable to any federal
felony, regardless of whether the statute already incorporates use of
a dangerous weapon as an element of the offense. This decision may
burden defendants with double punishment, especially if the penalty
for the armed offense already has been legislatively increased over
that of the same offense without any weapon." Presumably, the
Fourth Circuit will not entertain such double jeopardy arguments
after Crew.48 Whether the multiple punishment argument is viable in
other circuits is presently unknown, except in the Fifth Circuit, which
concurs with the Fourth Circuit's interpretation." After Crew, if the
prosecution so charges, future defendants in the Fourth Circuit facing
federal armed bank robbery charges may now also face the additional
' See, e.g., United States v. Gaddis, 424 U.S. 544 (1976); Heflin v. United States,
358 U.S. 415 (1959); United States v. Atkinson, 512 F.2d 1235 (4th Cir. 1975).
4 See United States v. Crew, 538 F.2d 575, 578 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 97 S. Ct.
144 (1976).
" Id.
" See text accompanying notes 33-42 supra.
" See cases cited note 11 supra.
" See, e.g., The Federal Bank Robbery Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2113 (1970); text accom-
panying notes 18-20 supra.
" See text accompanying notes 22-24 supra.
" See text accompanying notes 22-25 supra.
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charge of the use or unlawful carrying of a firearm during commission
of a felony.0
FRANK F. BARR
G. Receiving Stolen Property Under the Federal Bank Robbery
Act
The Federal Bank Robbery Act' has undergone a number of
changes since its enactment in 1934.2 The current version of the Act
includes measures for the punishment of the crime of receiving stolen
bank property. 3 Section 2113(b) differentiates treatment of those
who steal from a bank in that if more than $100 is stolen the thief
has committed a felony, and a misdemeanor occurs if less than $100
is stolen. 4 Section 2113(c), which provides for the crime of receiving
50 Similarly, the Fourth Circuit recently held that a conviction for transporting
marijuana without payment of the transfer tax satisfies the requirement of a prior
conviction for a felony under any federal law relating to drug offenses, under The
Compehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970, 21 U.S.C. §
841(b)(1)(A) (1970). United States v. Truelove, 527 F.2d 980 (4th Cir. 1975). The court
read the statutory language as unequivocally including all federal criminal provisions
relating to marijuana. Id. at 983.
1 18 U.S.C. § 2113 (1970) (originally enacted as Act of May 18, 1934, ch. 304, §2,
48 Stat. 783).
2 In its original form the Act included only provisions prohibiting robbery. Act of
May 18, 1934, ch. 304, § 2, 48 Stat. 783. In 1937, amendments to the statute expanded
coverage to include burglary and larceny. Act of August 24, 1937, ch. 747, 50 Stat. 749.
The Act was also amended in 1940, when provisions were added concerning the illegal-
ity of receiving stolen bank property. Act of June 29, 1940, ch. 455, 54 Stat. 695. The
present form of the statute providing punishment for these crimes was enacted in 1948.
Act of June 28, 1948, ch. 645, §2113, 62 Stat. 796.
3 18 U.S.C. § 2113 (b) & (c) (1970).
4 18 U.S.C. § 2113 (b) & (c) (1970) reads as follows:
(b) Whoever takes and carries away, with intent to steal or pur-
loin, any property or money or any other thing of value exceeding $100
belonging to, or in the care, custody, control, management, or posses-
sion of any bank, credit union, or any savings and loan association,
shall be fined not more than $5,000 or imprisoned not more than ten
years, or both; or
Whoever takes and carries away, with intent to steal or purloin,
any property or money or any other thing of value not exceeding $100
belonging to or in the care, custody, control, management, or posses-
sion of any bank, credit union, or any savings and loan association,
shall be fined not more than $1,000 or imprisoned-not more than one
year, or both.
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stolen bank property, relies on § 2113(b) for determining the punish-
ment of the receiver.5
Presently, there is a conflict among courts of appeals concerning
subsections (b) and (c) of the ActA The Fourth Circuit in United
States v. Wright7 held .that the receiver's penalty must be based
upon the amount stolen by the thief, regardless of the amount re-
ceived.8 Conversely, the Eighth Circuit has ruled in United States v.
Evans' that in determining the receiver's penalty, consideration
must be given to the penalty the thief would have gotten if he had
taken the amount received."°
In Wright, the appellant contended that since the government
failed to prove that the money received exceeded $100, he was im-
properly convicted and sentenced as a felon. The Fourth Circuit
disagreed, holding that the failure to prove receipt of more than $100
was immaterial in determining whether the accused committed a
felony or a misdemeanor. 2 Instead, the court interpreted the legisla-
tive history of the Act 3 as requiring sentencing on the basis of the
(c) Whoever receives, possesses, conceals, stores, barters, sells,
or disposes of any property or money or other thing of value knowing
the same to have been taken from a bank, credit union, or a savings
and loan association, in violation of subsection (b) of this section shall
be subject to the punishment provided by said subsection (b) for the
taker.
'Id.
See note 4 supra.
540 F.2d 1247 (4th Cir. 1976).
See text accompanying notes 11-16 infra.
446 F.2d 998 (8th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1021 (1972).
" See text accompanying notes 21-25 infra.
" 540 F.2d at 1247.
£2 Id. The court also noted that the appellant was intimately concerned with the
robbery of the bank. His car was used in the robbery and the robbers returned to his
house after the robbery, where he helped in removing red dye from the money. The
court also mentioned that there was evidence that the appellant had been promised
$800 for his part in the robbery. Id.
,M In its analysis of the legislative history of the Federal Bank Robbery Act, the
court traced the evolution of the Act from 1934. See note 2 supra. The court specifically
focused upon the 1948 amendment, which altered the receiver's punishment as con-
tained in the 1940 amendment. The 1940 amendment made no distinction based upon
the amount of stolen property actually received in providing for maximum punishment
of ten years imprisonment or a $5,000 fine. Act of June 24, 1940, ch. 455, 54 Stat. 695.
The Supreme Court noted in Heflin v. United States, 358 U.S. 415, 419 (1958), that
there is very little useful legislative history concerning § 2113(c). The Senate Report
of the 1940 amendment states, "[tihis bill would add another subsection to further
make it a crime, with less severe penalties to willfully become a receiver or possessor
of property taken in violation of the statute." S. REP. No. 1801, 76th Cong., 3d Sess. 1
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amount stolen from the bank. Placing major emphasis on the Revi-
sor's Note to the 1948 amendment,'4 the Fourth Circuit combined
literal reading of the statute with practical considerations. Evidence
of exactly what was stolen from the bank could be readily ascertaina-
ble, whereas proof of the amount actually passing to the receiver
might be impossible to obtain. 15 This consideration resulted in what
the Wright court saw as judicial expediency in simplifying the pun-
ishment of receivers."
The Fourth Circuit's determination that the receiver's penalty
should be based on the value of what was stolen accords with the
Ninth Circuit's holding in United States v. Bolin. 7 The appellant in
Bolin challenged his conviction for receiving money that had been
stolen from a federal bank. Because he possessed only $65 of that
money at the time he was arrested, the appellant argued that he
should not have been sentenced under the provisions of § 2113 for a
theft of over $100.18 As in Wright, the Bolin court analyzed the
legislative history of the Federal Bank Robbery Act to find that the
punishment of the receiver is determined by the amount stolen." In
addition to considering legislative history, the Bolin court compared
the Federal Bank Robbery Act with the Federal Conspiracy statute
to justify its interpretation of subsection (c).11 Upon the basis of
(1940). The House report on the amendment to § 2113(c) stated, "[p]resent law does
not make it a separate substantive offense knowingly to receive or possess property
stolen from a bank in violation of the Federal Bank Robbery Act, and this bill is
designed to cover that omission." H.R. REP. No. 1668, 76th Cong., 3d Sess. 1 (1940).
" The Revisor's Note for the 1948 amendment, codified at 18 U.S.C. § 2113 (1970)
explained the application to the receiver of the punishment provisions for the thief:
"[tihere seems no good reason why the thief of less than $100 should be liable to a
maximum of imprisonment of one year and the receiver subject to [ten] years."
" This argument is refuted by the fact that a person is usually punished for the
value of the stolen property with which he is apprehended. See examples cited in 446
F.2d 998, 1001. The statute provides for this by using the word "possesses." See note
4 supra.
11 In support of its judicial expediency argument, the court noted that "[piroof
of the amount taken from the bank is readily available, but proof of its division among
primary and secondary participants may be impossible to obtain." 540 F.2d at 1248.
17 423 F.2d 834 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 954 (1970). The Fourth Circuit
in Wright used Bolin as principal authority for its holding. 540 F.2d at 1248.
" To support his contention, the appellant in Bolin cited the example of two
people found guilty under § 2113(c) of receiving less than $100. Even if they had
received identical amounts, each would be subject to different degrees of punishment
if one received from a person who had stolen more than $100 and the other received
from a peirson who took less than $100. 423 F.2d at 837.
" Id. at 836 n.2. See also note 13 supra.
Id. at 837. The statute compared was 18 U.S.C. § 371 (1970), the Federal
Conspiracy Statute. This statute has provisions for misdemeanor or felony punishment
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these considerations, the Bolin court upheld the appellant's convic-
tion.
The Eighth Circuit decision in United States v. Evans,2 how-
ever, conflicts with the Wright and Bolin interpretation of.the sen-
tencing provisions of the Federal Bank Robbery Aet. In Evans, the
defendant was convicted of receiving a stolen bank money order
which had been filled in and which he subsequently cashed for an
amount in excess of $150. On appeal, the defendant asserted that
because the money order was blank when it was stolen, its actual
value was minimal.2 Following Bolin, the appellant in Evans argued
that the money order should have been valued as of the time it was
stolen, thus making his crime of possession a misdemeanor. The Gov-
ernment, however, asserted that the receiver's penalty should have
been based upon the total value of the money orders stolen, which in
a "thieves market" exceeded $1,500. The Evans court noted the
Bolin decision in considering the argument that because the value of
all the stolen money orders was over $1,500, felony liability should be
imposed, regardless of the amount received by the defendant. Never-
theless, the court utilized what it determined to be the correct inter-
pretation of the sentencing provisions of the Federal Bank Robbery
Act" and held that the legislative history did not indicate that the
receiver's punishment should be determined by the actions of the
thief.2 Because the value of the money order possessed by the appel-
that are based upon whether the conspiracy was one to commit a misdemeanor or a
felony. The Bolin court compared the case of two people intending to commit misde-
meanors, entering into two separate conspiracies. If one of the individuals were in a
conspiracy whose members committed a felony, that individual would be subject to a
greater penalty than the other one, even though they may have received identical
benefits. 423 F.2d at 837-38. This is reflected in the rule that a co-conspirator is liable
for the crimes of his fellow conspirators. 18 U.S.C. § 371 (1970); Pinkerton v. United
States, 399 F.2d 106, 118 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 933 (1968).
21 446 F.2d 998 (8th Cir. 1971).
2 See note 26 infra.
2 The "thieves market" concept utilized by the government in Evans concerns the
value placed upon stolen blank money orders by persons knowingly purchasing them
from a thief. According to prosecution testimony, each money order had a value of from
$5.00 to $10.00 in the "thieves market." Id. at 1000.
"1 Id. at 1000-01. The Wright, Bolin and Evans courts all scrutinized the same
section of the Historical and Revision Notes following 18 U.S.C. §2113 (1970) to ascer-
tain legislative intent. Nevertheless, their results differed. See text accompanying
notes 14-19 supra.
11 The Evans court saw this to be the "basic fallacy" of the Bolin decision. Punish-
ing one for the acts of another undermines a basic principle of criminal law: "[Tihat
the punishment should fit the defendant's crime, not that of another." This principle,
however, does not apply to conspiracy. See note 20 supra.
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lant exceeded $100 at the time he cashed it, however, the court af-
firmed his conviction as a felon.26
The apparent conflict of the Fourth and Ninth Circuits with the
Eighth Circuit may be partially reconciled by the variations in the
facts of the cases. In Wright and Bolin, the money taken from the
bank had an ascertainable value, whereas in Evans, the value of the
blank money orders was uncertain.Y Nevertheless, the major discrep-
ancy between the courts lies in what each has determined to be the
legislative intent behind § 2113.28
Regardless of these differences, the rationales of Wright and Bolin
are useful when specific amounts of cash are stolen. Setting penalties
for receivers based upon the amount stolen simplifies proof, because
the amount possessed by the receiver at the time of arrest may be
much less than the amount initially received.Y The Evans rationale
is helpful when blank money orders are stolen, because problems of
proof can be lessened by looking to the value placed upon the money
order by the receiver.2 The policy underlying enforcement of the
Federal Bank Robbery Act, however, should be consistent and pun-
ishment provisions should not be varied merely because one theft
involved cash and another money orders. Two facts appear from the
legislative history of § 2113(c) that clarify its meaning. First, the
crime of receiving stolen bank property had an origin independent of
the initial Federal Bank Robbery Act." This may indicate that the
" The court found the appellant's argument that individual blank money orders
were only worth $.015 had no merit because no authority was cited in support of the
argument. Id. at 999.
" One way in which the value of stolen blank money orders may be determined
is by the amount the thief or receiver obtains in their exchange. E.g., United States v.
Tyler, 466 F.2d 920 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1045 (1972); United States v.
Johnson, 442 F.2d 318 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 861 (1971). In Johnson, the
appellant's conviction for receiving stolen money orders was affirmed because the court
found that the appellant's attempt to sell eight of the orders for $150 established value.
442 F.2d at 319. Another way to ascertain the value of blank money orders is to
introduce testimony concerning valuation on a "thieves market." This would not be
as reliable as the aforementioned method because of the subjectivity of the determina-
tion. 446 F.2d at 1000-02; See note 23 supra.
21 See note 24 supra.
29 United States v. Bolin, 423 F.2d 934, 838. This problem is especially applicable
to cash which can be easily co-mingled with other funds or transferred to confederates
or unsuspecting parties. Id. But see United States v. Wright, 540 F.2d 1247, 1249 (4th
Cir. 1976) (Winter, J. dissenting). Proof of knowledge of the amount stolen is not
included in the crime of knowing receipt under § 2113(c).
' This method has also been used when unsigned traveler's checks have been
stolen from a bank. United States v. Tyler, 466 F.2d 920 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 409
U.S. 1045 (1972).
1, 446 F.2d at 1000. See note 2 supra.
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punishment for this particular crime should not be dependent upon
the amount stolen in violation of the Act. Second, the 1948 amend-
ment to the Act was meant to' correct the unfair punishment provi-
sions which subjected a receiver of less than $100 to a greater penalty
than the thief of an identical amount.2 These distinctions accord
with Evans, which held that a receiver's punishment should be based
upon the amount he receives. Nevertheless, a literal reading of the
statute supports the results of the Wright and Bolin courts."
How the Fourth Circuit would interpret § 2113(c) if it were pre-
sented with a case like Evans is uncertain. If the court maintained
its theory that the receiver's penalty must be based upon the value
of the goods stolen, difficulties would arise in determining the value
of the blank money orders at the time they were taken. The Fourth
Circuit itself criticized difficulty of proof problems in support of its
holding in Wright.3"
Considering the practicality argument in Wright,35 in the case of
blank money orders the Fourth Circuit might prefer to value them
according to the amount placed upon them by the receiver. Valuation
utilizing the "thieves market" approach as argued by the
Government in Evans3 might be an alternatiye, but that would tend
to produce the problems of proof that were discussed in Wright.
3
1 If
the Fourth Circuit did base the punishment for receiving stolen
money orders upon the value given them by the receiver, it might
have to alter its interpretation of § 2113 to accord with the Eighth
Circuit's decision in Evans.3' Evans thus provides the better interpre-
tation of § 2113 not only because it effectively considers the valua-
tion problem of stolen money orders, but more importantly because
it properly punishes the receiver for the crime he has committed."
2 446 F.2d at 1000. See note 14 supra.
3 See note 4 supra. The approach taken by the Wright and Bolin courts was a
literal interpretation of the wording of § 2113(c).
3' 540 F.2d at 1248. In considering the difficulty of proof problem, the Fourth
Circuit reasoned that since proof of the amount taken from the bank is readily ascer-
tainable, it should be the basis for the receiver's penalty. See text accompanying note
16 supra.
540 F.2d at 1248.
446 F.2d at 1000. See note 23 supra.
17 Valuation using the "thieves market" is based upon testimony and would be a
question of fact for the jury to determine. Id. at 1002. See note 23 supra.
38 Judge Winter dissenting in Wright felt that the Fourth Circuit should have
followed the rationale of Evans. As did the court in Evans, Judge Winter believed that
the punishment should fit the crime of the defendant not someone else's. 540 F.2d at
1248-49 (Winter, J. dissenting). See note 25 supra.
" See note 25 supra.
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